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INTRODUCTION
Striving to create an atmosphere conducive to learning, public
school teachers, administrators, and security guards sometimes use phys-
ical force to control disruptive students. How school officials use physi-
cal force matters because students have a right to be free from
"unreasonable" seizures, as protected by the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.' School officials generally use physical force
in two ways: to gain immediate control over disruptive students or to
corporally punish them. Determining the reasonableness of their actions
is a complex, novel inquiry because courts have rarely applied the Fourth
Amendment to school officials' use of physical force to control and pun-
ish students. 2 Instead, courts have rejected these claims under the Four-
teenth Amendment's substantive due process component, requiring
I U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For an analysis of how these claims may fall under the
Fourth Amendment as incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
see Kathryn R. Urbonya, Public School Official's Use of Physical Force as a Fourth Amend-
ment Seizure: Protecting Students from the Constitutional Chasm between the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2000).
2 See Urbonya, supra note 1, at 4-8.
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students to prove a "shocking" use of force.3 Few students are able to
meet that difficult standard. How courts apply the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness standard in the future may thus result in more students
bringing suits against school officials.
The purpose of this article is to examine public school officials' use
of physical force under the Fourth Amendment. Part I discusses how the
United States Supreme Court has defined reasonableness when police
officers use physical force to arrest suspects. These decisions underscore
that assessing reasonableness requires consideration of all the circum-
stances confronting officials. Part II examines the unique context of the
public schools by describing the Court's determination of Fourth
Amendment reasonableness with respect to searches by school officials.
In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,4 the Court assessed the reasonableness of
searching an individual student's purse and, in Vernonia School District
47J v. Acton,5 the Court discussed the reasonableness of mandatory drug-
testing for student athletes. In both cases, the Court's reasonableness
determination focused on the special context of public schools.
Part III revisits the decision of Ingraham v. Wright,6 which sharply
divided the Court even at the time it was decided in the 1970s. The
majority held that public school officials need not provide students with
process before hitting them for violating school rules. 7 In reaching its
holding, the majority erroneously fused two types of force, force to con-
trol and force to punish, and assumed that striking public school students
constituted effective discipline, a conclusion eroded by the Court's more
modem personal security jurisprudence under the Fourth Amendment.
Ingraham failed to discern that hitting is a "punishment" that harms both
the student and the learning environment.
Part IV explores three significant aspects of the Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence as applied to the public schools. First, it dis-
tinguishes between the authority that public school officials have in edu-
cating students and the authority that parents possess in caring for
children. School officials have only "custodial" and "tutelary" powers,8
and any force used must further the schools' educational goals. In con-
trast, some parents use physical force to further their religious beliefs as
3 See id. at 38-41 (examining the history and difficulty of students' substantive due
process claims challenging school officials' use of physical force).
4 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
5 515 U.S, 646 (1995).
6 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
7 Id. The Court also held that the Eighth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, which
prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments," did not apply to students subjected
to physical punishment by public school officials. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 659-71.
8 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995).
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protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.9
Second, the Supreme Court interprets reasonableness by considering the
history of the right to personal security, both at common law and under
modern practices. Third, this section describes the significant psycho-
logical differences between physical force to control and physical force
to punish: physical force to punish may engender both psychological
harm to students and a poor environment for learning.
Part V then applies a reasonableness standard for public school offi-
cials' use of physical force in light of the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment personal security decisions. It distinguishes sharply be-
tween school officials using force to regain order in the school and force
used to punish. It contends that, even though the Fourth Amendment
affords public school officials broad deference in their decisions to use
physical force to control students, they have no discretion to use physical
force as "punishment," in light of the Court's modern personal security
decisions. The Fourth Amendment thus allows public school officials to
act quickly to break up fighting, out-of-control students, but it also bars
corporal punishment in the public schools.
I. POLICE OFFICERS' USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Police officers, suspects, prosecutors, judges, and juries often disa-
gree as to what constitutes "reasonable" physical force in apprehending
citizens. Such disagreements are inevitable because defining "reasona-
bleness" under the Fourth Amendment requires a case-by-case balancing
of conflicting interests. 0 In addition, officers face so many different sit-
uations that reasonableness evades easy categorization. The Supreme
Court attempted to create such a "category" in Tennessee v. Garner' as
it examined an officer's use of deadly force. However, in Graham v.
Connor,'2 the Court declined to employ a categorical approach as to the
use of non-deadly force. Both these cases reveal that context determines
9 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10 See, e.g., Kenneth Adams, Measuring the Prevalence of Police Abuse of Force, in
POLICE VIOLENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE 52 (William
A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996) (rejecting the idea of concrete "facts" as to what constitutes
"excessive" force, particularly as the definition of "excessive" changes over time). See also
SAMUEL G. CHAPMAN, MURDERED ON DUTY: THE KILLING OF POLICE OFFICERS IN AMERICA
5-13 (1998) (describing police officers as "punching bags" because of the assaults inflicted by
the public); JEROME H4. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE USE OF
EXCESSIVE FORCE 23-42 (1993) (examining the conflict between the public and officers in
assessing what constitutes reasonable force). See generally MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE
MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION § 2.15, at 2-28 to 2-34 (2000) (collection of cases exam-
ining Fourth Amendment reasonableness).
' 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
12 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
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the level of deference given to police officers' judgments: the greater the
harm inflicted on suspects, the less deference officers receive from
courts, juries, and the public.
In Garner, the Supreme Court examined the use of deadly force not
just in light of common-law practices,' 3 but also in light of evolving
notions of what constitutes effective, sound policing.1 4 At issue in Gar-
ner was an officer's intentional shooting of a fleeing suspect. 15 The of-
ficer had reason to believe that the suspect had committed a burglary but
did not have any reason to believe that the suspect had harmed anyone.' 6
As the suspect fled over a fence, the officer shot him in the back. ' 7 Even
though a state statute had authorized this kind of shooting,' 8 the Court
held that the shooting was "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amend-
ment.' 9 In so doing, the Court created a category for assessing reasona-
bleness: deadly force is reasonable when an officer has "probable cause
that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the
officer or to others." 20
However, even in using this categorical approach, officers, courts,
and juries have struggled to balance the interests of suspects and the pub-
lic. The Garner Court properly noted that suspects have a "fundamental
interest" 2 1 in life and that the reasonableness of taking suspects' lives
thus depends on the threat to the lives of others. The problem has not
been in recognizing the importance of bodily integrity on both sides of
the scale, but rather in determining what actually happened and the de-
gree of danger, whether to officers or communities.
In examining the question of danger, the Garner Court looked to
contemporary notions of sound policing.2 2 It noted some movement
away from the common-law rule that allowed shootings under broader
circumstances.2 3 And even though a majority of states had not rejected
the common-law rule, the Court determined that it should consider con-
temporary practices in determining reasonableness.2 4 Specifically, the
13 Garner, 471 U.S. at 12-15.
14 id. at 14-22.
15 Id. at 7.
16 Id. at 3-4.
S7 Id. at 4.
18 Id. 4-5.
19 Id. at 22 (stating that statute was "invalid insofar as it purported to give [the officer]
the authority" to shoot a fleeing burglar).
20 Id. at 11.
21 Id. at 9.
22 Id. at 15-19.
23 Id.
24 The Court conceded, "[i]t cannot be said that there is a constant or overwhelming
trend away from the common-law rule .... Nonetheless, the long-term movement has been
away from the rule that deadly force may be used against any fleeing felon, and that remains
the rule in less than half the States." Id. at 18.
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Court referenced actual police department policies, stating that it "would
hesitate to declare a police practice of long standing 'unreasonable' if
doing so would severely hamper effective law enforcement. '25 Relying
upon documented research, the Court concluded that limiting the use of
deadly force to its new category-"when suspects threaten the infliction
of serious physical harm"-would not undermine effective law enforce-
ment goals.26
By contrast, when police officers use non-deadly force, the Supreme
Court applies a case-specific balancing test2 7 rather than its categorical
approach when considering the reasonableness of the use of deadly force.
Though noting that Fourth Amendment reasonableness "is not capable of
precise definition or mechanical application," 28 the Graham Court did
suggest three factors relevant in assessing the reasonableness of the use
of non-deadly force to apprehend suspects: the severity of the offense
committed, the danger presented to the officer and the community, and
the nature of the suspect's attempt to resist arrest and flee.29 Linking this
case to Garner, the Court noted that, in considering whether the use of
deadly or non-deadly force meets the Fourth Amendment's standard of
reasonableness, courts must examine all circumstances. 30
The Graham Court did limit this totality of circumstances test in
three ways: (1) it rejected using the officers' motive to establish or ne-
gate reasonableness; 31 (2) it advocated deference to officers' "split-sec-
ond judgments" 32 under case-specific and emergent circumstances; and
(3) it explained that, to be constitutionally unreasonable, the force used
must consist of more than a simple "unnecessary push or shove. 33
25 Id. at 19.
26 Id. (quoting amicus brief of Police Foundation et al. at 11):
After extensive research and consideration, [they] have concluded that laws permit-
ting police officers to use deadly force to apprehend unarmed, non-violent fleeing
felony suspects actually do not protect citizens or law enforcement officers, do not
deter crime or alleviate problems caused by crime, and do not improve the crime-
fighting ability of law enforcement agencies.
Id.
27 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989).
28 Id. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)).
29 Id.
30 Id. (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 8-9, which stated that the question is "'whether the
totality of circumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of ... seizure' ").
31 Id. at 397. Although the Court explicitly rejected malice as an element of a Fourth
Amendment claim, it did not bar using malice to undermine officers' credibility as to what
they claim actually happened. Id. at 399 n.12 (stating that the factfinder may consider "evi-
dence that officer may have harbored ill-will toward the citizen" in assessing an officer's
credibility).
32 Id. at 396-97.
33 Id. at 396 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033
(1973)).
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The Court rejected motive analysis by declaring that, in the context
of an officer's use of force in apprehending a suspect, reasonableness is
an objective standard. 34 Neither an injured suspect nor an officer may
use motive to establish or disprove a Fourth Amendment violation: "An
officer's evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out
of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer's good in-
tentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional. '35
Instead, reasonableness considers other circumstances. 36
The Court also stressed that the use of physical force must be as-
sessed in light of what the "reasonable officer" would have done in the
case-specific situation. 37 Warning against "20/20 hindsight, ' 38 the Court
recognized that policing requires officers to make quick decisions and
opined that "[tihe calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for
the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judg-
ments" in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving"
about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. 39 It
follows that, in assessing reasonableness, one must consider how much
time an officer had before deciding to act.
The third limitation on the totality of the circumstances test im-
pliedly distinguishes between constitutional violations and batteries cov-
ered under state tort law. As the Court has stated in other personal
security litigation cases, the challenged actions must be sufficiently of-
fensive to rise to the level of a constitutional violation before an analysis
of Fourth Amendment reasonableness will even be appropriate. Once
officers' actions cross this threshold, then the Fourth Amendment ap-
plies, even if their actions also violated state law. For example, in
Monroe v. Pape, the Court declared that the availability of a state-law
remedy does not negate the presence of a constitutional violation.40 It
further noted that the aim of constitutional tort litigation under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 is to hold state officials accountable for their constitutional viola-
tions because the state law may be "invidious," the state's remedy may
be inadequate, or the remedy may be available only in theory. 41 The
Monroe Court also pointed out that, even when state officials act con-
34 Id. at 397.
35 Id.
36 Id. (indicating that objective reasonableness is to be determined "in light of the facts
and circumstances confronting [the officers] without regard to their underlying motivation").
37 Id. at 396.
38 Id. ("The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspec-
tive of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.").
39 Id. at 396-97.
40 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
41 Id.
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trary to state law, their actions still fall within the purview of the statute
designed to check abuses by state officials.42
The Court's guidelines for determining reasonableness thus leave
much room for debate as to what is unreasonable physical force under
the Fourth Amendment. Nonetheless, three themes link Garner and Gra-
ham: (1) a focus on the nature of the suspect's actions; (2) an understand-
ing that reasonableness is ultimately determined by examining the
totality of circumstances; and (3) a recognition of reasonableness as an
objective inquiry.
II. REASONABLE SEARCHES BY PUBLIC SCHOOL OFFICIALS
The Supreme Court has yet to subject the use of physical force by
public school officials to Fourth Amendment scrutiny. However, be-
cause the Court has twice applied the Fourth Amendment's reasonable-
ness standard to searches in the public schools, its discussion of
reasonableness in that context informs an approach to assessing the rea-
sonableness of the use of physical force by public school officials. In
New Jersey v. T.L.O.,43 searching a student's purse was held to be rea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment and, in Vernonia School District
47J v. Acton,44 drug-testing of student athletes similarly survived consti-
tutional scrutiny. Although the Court decided these cases ten years apart,
T.L.O. in 1985 and Vernonia in 1995, both decisions emphasize the
unique environment of public schools, i.e., that a Fourth Amendment rea-
sonableness inquiry must consider public schools' mission-education. 45
A. REASONABLE SCHOOL SEARCHES: NEW JERSEY V. T.L.O.
In 1985, for the first time, the Supreme Court faced the difficult task
of delimiting public school officials' power to search a student's purse.
In New Jersey v. T.L.O. 46 the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry
focused on one student-T.L.O., a fourteen-year old girl who allegedly
violated a school rule against smoking in the bathroom. 47 The facts of
T.L.O. recount what could be a typical school day and help to explain
why the Court sharply distinguishes between searches by school officials
and searches by police officers looking for criminal violations.
42 Id. at 172-87.
43 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
44 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
45 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653-56; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339-43.
46 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
47 Id. at 328.
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1. Examining the Purse: The Facts of T.L.O.
Under school rules, smoking at school was illegal, but possession of
cigarettes was not.48 When a teacher "discovered" two girls smoking in
the bathroom, she took the students to the vice-principal's office.49
T.L.O.'s friend admitted to smoking in the bathroom, and T.L.O. denied
it.50 According to the Court, the vice-principal then had reasonable sus-
picion that T.L.O. had violated the school's rule against smoking.5 1 He
lawfully opened her purse (which the Court determined was the obvious
place to find T.L.O.'s cigarettes) 52 and saw a package of cigarettes. 53
When he grabbed the cigarettes, he saw a package of cigarette rolling
papers, which he thought was related to marijuana use.54 Again accord-
ing to the Court, the official's "second" search was based on reasonable
suspicion that T.L.O. had marijuana as well.55 This search revealed "a
small amount of marijuana, a pipe, a number of empty plastic bags," 56
lots of one-dollar bills, and an index card listing names and entitled "peo-
ple who owe me money." 57 The vice-principal then notified T.L.O.'s
parents and the police. 58 The school suspended T.L.O. for ten days -
three days for smoking and seven days for possessing marijuana. 59
The state also held T.L.O. to be a delinquent under state law. 60 The
New Jersey Supreme Court later vacated on grounds that the search was
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 61 On appeal to the Supreme
Court, the issue presented was whether the exclusionary rule applied to
juvenile delinquency proceedings, 62 but the Court decided the case on a
broader ground, holding that the vice-principal's searches did not violate
the Fourth Amendment. 63 In short, the Court deemed the searches
"reasonable." 64
48 Id. at 344.
49 Id. at 328.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 345-46.
52 Id. at 346.
53 Id. at 328.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 347.
56 Id. at 328.
57 Id. at 347.
58 Id. at 328.
59 Id. at 329 n.1.
60 Id. at 330.
61 Id. at 330-31.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 347-48.
64 Id.
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2. Defining Reasonableness in School Searches: The Model of
Terry v. Ohio
In interpreting what constitutes Fourth Amendment reasonableness
for searches in public schools, the Court drew upon its analysis in Terry
v. Ohio,65 a case that established new boundaries for determining the
reasonableness of police officers' stops and frisks. Under Terry, officers
may forcibly detain a suspect if they have reasonable suspicion that the
suspect is about to commit a crime, and they may frisk with reasonable
suspicion that the suspect is "armed and dangerous." 66 The T.L.O. Court
quoted the open-ended language of Terry to describe the reasonableness
standard for school searches:
Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a
twofold inquiry: first, one must consider "whether the
• . . action was justified at its inception"; second, one
must determine whether the search as actually conducted
"was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place. '67
Thus, the T.L.O. Court held that, in determining the reasonableness of
Fourth Amendment searches by public school officials, courts must con-
sider the suspicion underlying the search and the scope of the search in
light of the basis for suspicion.
Even though the Court applied the Terry doctrine, it hinted that it
might later deviate from it. With the Terry decision requiring reasonable
suspicion to justify a police officer's stop and frisk, the T.L.O. Court left
open the question of whether reasonable suspicion is always required
before school officials may conduct "reasonable" school searches,68 an
ambiguity that the Court later used in Vernonia School District 47J. v.
Acton,69 to justify the reasonableness of drug-testing student athletes.
Perhaps even more significant is that, unlike Terry stops, school of-
ficials need not have reasonable suspicion as to a violation of criminal
65 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
66 Id. at 30. Since Terry, the Court has extended this view of reasonableness to other
contexts. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1990) (officers may conduct a
"protective sweep" to inspect "those spaces where a person may be found" if they have "rea-
sonable suspicion" of danger during the execution of an arrest warrant); Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1983) (officers may "frisk" the passenger compartment of a vehicle with
reasonable suspicion that weapons are present during a valid traffic stop). The Court has at
times also refused to expand Terry's definition of reasonableness. See, e.g., Florida v. J.L.,
120 S.Ct. 1375, 1379-80 (2000) (refusing to create a "firearm" exception to Terry which
would have allowed officers to frisk a person for weapons based on only an anonymous tip
about illegal firearm possession); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373-74 (1993) (re-
fusing to allow officers to frisk a person based on reasonable suspicion of drug possession).
67 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
68 Id. at 342 n.8.
69 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
2001] REASONABLENESS UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 407
law; mere reasonable suspicion that the student violated a school rule is
sufficient to justify a reasonable search. 70 In allowing searches for
school violations, therefore, the Court gave school officials broader pow-
ers than those afforded police officers under the Terry doctrine, even
admonishing courts that they should, "as a general matter," refrain from
"distinguish [ing] between rules that are important to the preservation of
order in the schools and rules that are not."'7' The Court did not decide
whether its new standard would apply to searches conducted in concert
with police officers.72
The standard announced in T.L.O. also differs from Terry with re-
gard to its analysis of the reasonable scope of the search. The search
must be "reasonably related to the objectives of the search. '73 In a Terry
context, this means that the scope of the search must relate to the need to
disarm the suspect. 74 Yet, in the school context, the T.L.O. Court specifi-
cally mentioned that school officials should consider the degree of intru-
sion "in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the
infraction," 75 thus creating a potentially more open-ended standard for
assessing the scope of a reasonable school search than for a traditional
Terry stop and frisk.
3. Looking to the Purpose of the Search: Genesis of the
"Special Needs" Doctrine
In defining reasonableness, the Court in T.L.O. focused on the
schools' need to control students and the special relationship between
school officials and students. The Court's willingness to make the non-
law enforcement purpose of an intrusive activity a part of the reasonable-
ness calculus laid the foundation for the now well established "special
needs" doctrine under the Fourth Amendment. 76 In a concurring opin-
ion, Justice Blackmun effectively described the "special needs" doctrine:
"Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond
the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-
70 Id. (characterizing the requisite reasonable suspicion as a reason to believe that stu-
dents violated either "the law or the rules of the school").
71 Id. at 342-43 n.9.
72 Id. at 341 n.7.
73 Id. at 342.
74 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
75 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342.
76 See e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322-23 (1997) (rejecting drug-testing re-
quirement for candidates running for state political offices); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646 (1995) (explicitly applying the "special needs" doctrine to drug-testing of ath-
letes. For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 86-141 and accompanying text); Nat'l
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 664-65 (1989) (upholding drug-test-
ing of customs employees carrying weapons or involved with drug interdiction); Skinner v.
Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (upholding drug-testing of railroad
employees after major train accidents).
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cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its bal-
ancing of interests for that of the Framers. '77
Thus, in T.L.O., the reasonableness inquiry focused on the adminis-
trative, "special needs" purpose of the search and, impliedly, whether
school officials were acting more like police officers, parents, or some-
thing else. The vice-principal's purpose in searching the purse was the
enforcement of school rules, presumably to ensure an effective, disci-
plined, learning environment and not to bring about the criminal prosecu-
tion of T.L.O.
How the Court characterized the school official's capacity also re-
lated to the state-action question, i.e., whether school officials were even
subject to the Fourth Amendment. In answering the state-action ques-
tion, the Court looked to Fourth Amendment decisions that involved
searches done for regulatory, not criminal, purposes, such as searches by
building inspectors, firefighters, and safety inspectors. 78 Because the
Fourth Amendment applied to these "regulatory" actors, school officials
also were subject to the Fourth Amendment restraints - the need to act
reasonably. The Court focused on the pedagogical mission of public
schools and the need to define the constitutional relationship between
school officials and students in light of that mission. In doing so, it re-
peatedly referred to the actual practices in public schools 79 and stated
77 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring), The T.L.O. majority did not
clearly lay out this modem framework of the "special needs" doctrine, but it did effectively
describe the groundwork for Justice Blackmun's explicit doctrinal category. The majority
cited Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1976), a case that analyzed the "unique"
context of "administrative searches" to uncover housing code violations. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at
337; Camara, 387 U.S. at 534. Camara explained that "administrative searches" at times may
lead to the discovery of criminal violations, but their underlying purpose is not to serve crimi-
nal prosecutorial goals. Id. at 537 (stating that the inspections were not "aimed at the discov-
ery of evidence of a crime"). Camara redefined both "probable cause" for these
"administrative" searches and the warrant requirement. Id. at 535-39. The kind of "probable
cause" necessary for these searches did not "depend upon specific knowledge of the condition
of a particular dwelling." Id. at 538. Instead officials could get warrants based on a "reasona-
ble legislative or administrative" scheme to select areas for inspections. Id. The Court has
extended this type of "administrative search" to other "unique" contexts. See, e.g., New York
v. Burger, 482 U.S. 695, 699 (1987). In Burger, police officers conducted "administrative
searches" of "automobile junkyards" pursuant to a state statute that also gave them arrest
powers. Id. at 694-95. The Court noted that "an administrative scheme may have the same
ultimate purpose as the penal laws, even if its regulatory goals are narrower." Id. at 713. The
Court discerned "plain administrative purposes" for the statute, rejecting that the inspections
were pretextual acts to uncover criminal violations. Id. at 716 n.27.
78 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 325 (citing Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978) (fire
inspections); Marshal v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978) (occupational, health,
and safety inspections); Camara, 387 U.S. at 528 (housing code inspections)).
79 Id. at 339 (stating that the "State's suggestion that children have no legitimate need to
bring personal property into the schools [does not] seem well anchored in reality").
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that applying the doctrine of in loco parentis to school officials did not
make sense in light of "contemporary reality." 80
With school officials acting neither as police officers nor surrogate
parents, the Court had to decide how to measure reasonableness with
regard to this new category of searchers. The majority rejected requiring
probable cause and a warrant to conduct student searches because it
viewed schools as needing "swift and informal disciplinary proce-
dures." 81 Imposing a warrant requirement, the Court reasoned, would
"frustrate"8 2 the legitimate, non-law enforcement purpose of the searches
- creating a sound educational environment. In recognition of the "spe-
cial needs" of the schools, the T.L.O. Court opted instead for a pure bal-
ancing of interests, pitting "the schoolchild's legitimate expectations of
privacy" 83 against the "school's equally legitimate need to maintain an
environment in which learning can take place."'84 The Court then found
80 Id. at 336-37 ("In carrying out searches and other disciplinary functions, school offi-
cials act as representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for the parents, and they
cannot claim the parents' immunity from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.").
81 Id. at 340.
82 Id. (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 532-33).
83 Id.
84 Id. One scholar has interpreted T.L.O. as "sending conflicting messages" in "its strug-
gle to come to grips with school power." Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should Students Have Constitu-
tional Rights? Keeping Order in the Public Schools, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 49, 80 (1996).
For Professor Dupre, the middle ground taken by the Court - school officials were not police
officers nor parents-created mixed signals regarding the school's mission - "social recon-
struction" or "social reproduction." Id. at 64-69. In creating this dichotomy, Professor Dupre
views a "social reconstruction" purpose for schools as requiring courts to give less discretion
to school officials for their judgment, but to give them more if schools have a "social repro-
duction" purpose:
In the social reconstruction model, the school is an institution where power is neces-
sary only to facilitate the child in his attempts to reconstruct a new social order ....
The school as a force in reconstructing a new social order was a reverse of the
traditional function of public education in American society, in which the power of
the school was necessary to inculcate - to reproduce - society's traditions and
habits . . . .In contrast to the social reproduction model, which would allow the
school the power it needed to mold children in society's image, the social recon-
struction model would allow the student the power the student needs to avoid perpet-
uating society's flaws.
Id. at 65. Professor Dupre viewed the T.L.O. Court as a moving away 'from the "social recon-
struction" model and toward the "social reproduction" model: "It was hard to keep an image of
the pure school child leading society's reformation when the child keeps others from obtaining
a serious education and begins to look like an oppressor himself." Id. at 81.
Even though educators for decades have debated these contrasting models, id. at 65, in
the context of examining the constitutional rights of students, the dichotomy is difficult to
apply. Having students seek enforcement of their Fourth Amendment rights is consistent with
both models - social reconstruction and social reproduction - because of our long history of
respecting individual liberty, an interest that both furthers the individual and society.
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discipline a weighty interest that tipped the Fourth Amendment balance
in favor of the school officials in the T.L.O. case. 85
B. REASONABLENESS OF STUDENT DRUG-TESTING: VERNONIA
By 1995, when the Court faced the question of suspicion-less drug-
testing of student athletes in Vernonia School District 47J. v. Acton,8 6 it
had firmly established the "special needs" doctrine; the Court had upheld
suspicion-less drug-testing of railroad workers87 and customs officials. 88
Yet, when it decided Vernonia, the Supreme Court articulated a more
prominent role for the common law in determining Fourth Amendment
reasonableness, indicating that, in some situations, the common law
should possibly be the sole source in determining "reasonableness."8 9
However, as in T.L.O., the majority opinion also engaged in a general
balancing of interests. 90 Focusing on the nature of public schools, 91 the
majority ultimately upheld Vernonia's drug-testing policy as facially rea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment. 92 But the case also produced a
dissent that posited a dramatically different view of reasonableness 93 as
well as a concurring opinion advocating a strictly fact-specific holding.94
1. The School District's Drug-Testing Policy: Facts of Vernonia
The Vernonia School District in Oregon adopted a policy of drug-
testing student athletes after noticing that students were rude and had
used profane language in class.95 Believing that athletes were "role mod-
els" for other students and leaders of the district's drug culture, 96 the
district prohibited students from participating in sports unless they first,
with their parents' permission, signed a form consenting to urine
testing.97
85 T.L.O. 469 U.S. at 342 n.9 ("We have 'repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming
the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control the conduct in the schools.'").
86 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
87 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
88 Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (as applied to
officials carrying weapons and in drug interdiction).
89 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652-53.
90 Id. at 654-65.
91 Id. at 655-57.
92 Id. at 664-65.
93 Id. at 666-86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (joining were Justices Stevens and Souter).
94 Id. at 666 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stating holding applies only to student athletes
who voluntarily participate in team sports).
95 Id. at 648-49 (1995).
96 Id. at 649, 663.
97 Id. at 650.
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Under the plan, a laboratory examined the urine to detect the pres-
ence of "amphetamines, cocaine, and marijuana. '98 The athletes were
tested at the beginning of their chosen sport's season and then each week
thereafter, with school officials randomly selecting ten percent of the ath-
letes for further testing. 99 School officials of the same sex monitored the
giving of a sample: male officials viewed the backs of boys urinating,
and females stood outside the stalls of the girls, listening for the sounds
of urination. 1°° Students were to inform school officials about the pre-
scription drugs they were taking. 10 1 Only school officials received the
results of the tests; they did not give any information to the police. 10 2 If
a test came back positive for drug use, the school administered a second
test.' 0 3 Upon a second positive test, school officials notified the athlete's
parents.10 4 School officials then gave athletes the option of weekly test-
ing for drug use or suspension from athletics.' 0 5
Acton, a seventh grade student, refused to sign the consent form. 106
When school officials barred him from playing on the football team, his
parents filed suit, seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief that the
urine-testing policy was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 10 7 The Supreme Court, relying on the factual findings of
the district court, held that the testing was reasonable as a "special
needs" search. 108
2. Looking to the Common Law and Revisiting the "Special
Needs" Doctrine
The Vernonia decision created a special role for the common law in
Fourth Amendment analysis. Although the Court had previously consid-
ered the common law in assessing the reasonableness of a police officer
shooting a fleeing felon, i09 the Vernonia Court declared that the common
law should be not just a mere consideration but potentially outcome de-
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
1l Id. at 650, 660 (noting that this facial challenge to the district's drug-testing policy did
not assume that students had to give medical information directly to school officials but rather
that they may have done so confidentially by sealed envelope).
102 Id. at 658.
103 Id. at 651.
104 Id.
105 Id. If the school suspended an athlete who then tested positive again, another athletic
suspension ensued. A "third offense [resulted] in suspension for the remainder of the current
season and the next two athletic seasons." Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 664-66.
109 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1985). For a discussion of this case, see
supra notes 13-26 and accompanying text.
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terminative where a clear common-law rule exists.110 It thus offered a
new paradigm that some recent Supreme Court decisions also em-
brace."' In contrast to the Court's prior focus on the warrant require-
ment, a majority of the Court now embraced "reasonableness" as the
analytical starting point for Fourth Amendment claims, with the common
law being the first area to explore in adjudicating reasonableness." 2
Drawing upon the common law as a primary basis for Fourth
Amendment reasonableness analysis is no easy task because, as the
Vernonia dissent noted,' 13 one can characterize common-law practices in
a variety of ways. The Court noted that education began in the private
sector, with school officials having the authority to act in the manner that
110 515 U.S. at 652-53 (suggesting that the balancing test must apply "at least, in cases
such as this, where there was no clear practice, either approving or disapproving the type of
search at issue, at the time the constitutional provision was enacted").
I See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999). The Houghton
Court articulated a two-part inquiry for determining Fourth Amendment reasonableness, citing
Vernonia as a case where this new test was applied:
[W]e inquire first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure
under the common law when the Amendment was framed. Where that inquiry yields
no answer, we must evaluate the search or seizure under traditional standards of
reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon
an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.
Id. (citations omitted).
112 See Urbonya, supra note 1, at I I n.41 (describing the Court's shift from the warrant
requirement to a general reasonableness inquiry). Prior to this decision, the Court had some-
times embraced the common-law view and sometimes rejected it. See, e.g., Houghton, 526
U.S. at 311 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (denying the primacy of the common law as a test for
Fourth Amendment reasonableness); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995) (sug-
gesting a common-law rule on the search of dwellings to be authoritative); County of River-
side v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 55, 71 (1991) (argument between majority and dissent as to
whether common-law rule on probable cause determinations should have been outcome deter-
minative); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 n.2 (1991) (looking to common law to
explain the meaning of seizure); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1985) (rejecting the
common-law rule allowing the shooting of fleeing felons); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
598, 591 n.33. (1980) (rejecting the common law as to warrantless arrests in the home); United
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1976) (applying the common-law rule as to warrant-
less arrests in a public place).
113 515 U.S. at 681 n.1 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor wisely commented
that one may choose different levels of generality in describing the "common law":
[T]he historical materials on what the Framers thought of official searches of chil-
dren, let alone of public school children (the concept of which did not exist at the
time) are extremely scarce. Perhaps because of this, the Court does not itself offer
an account of the original meaning, but rather resorts to the general proposition that
children had fewer recognized rights at the time of the framing than they do today.
But that proposition seems uniquely unhelpful in the present case, for although chil-
dren may have had fewer rights against the private schoolmaster at the time of the
framing than they have against public school officials today, parents plainly had
greater rights then than now.
Id. (citation omitted).
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parents would authorize." 4 However, because the T.L.O. decision had
already distinguished modern-day public school officials from private
school teachers at common law, the common-law practice did not neatly
answer the reasonableness question in the Vernonia case.
The Court examined another aspect of the common law to deter-
mine reasonableness - how the common law characterized the relation-
ship between parents and children. 1 5 Under the common law, parents
enjoyed virtually unfettered power to control their children' 16 and, con-
trary to its analytical emphasis in the T.L.O. case, 1 17 the Vernonia Court
pointed to prior decisions recognizing that schoolteachers "for many pur-
poses" act in loco parentis118 in concluding that school officials do not
"exercise only parental power over their students."'" 9 By analogizing
common-law parental power to modern-day school officials' authority to
educate, the majority opinion stressed how few rights children had at
common law and, by extension, argued that children in the public
schools should perhaps have similarly limited rights not only with regard
to searches under the Fourth Amendment but also as to free speech rights
under the First Amendment and due process safeguards under the Four-
teenth Amendment.12 0
However, despite its analysis of the common law, the Vernonia ma-
jority decided that, because no clear practice existed when the Fourth
Amendment was framed, the Court should balance the interests impli-
cated, taking into account the "special needs" doctrine.12' In balancing,
the Court restated some of T.L.O.'s assumptions, but also added new
glosses to the "special needs" doctrine. To determine whether
Vernonia's drug-testing program was a reasonable "special needs"
search, the Vernonia Court considered four factors: (1) "the nature of the
[student's] privacy interest"; 22 (2) "the character of the intrusion"; 23 (3)
"the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern ... and; [4] the
efficacy of [the selected] means for meeting it.' ' 24
"Central"' 125 to the Court's analysis of the student's privacy interest
was the legal relationship between the student and the state. The Court
emphasized that Acton was a child "committed to the temporary custody
114 Id. at 654-55.
115 Id. at 654-56.
116 Id. at 654.
117 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
118 515 U.S. at 655.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 656.
121 Id. at 653.
122 Id. at 654.
123 Id. at 658.
124 Id. at 660.
125 Id. at 654.
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of the State as schoolmaster,"' 126 and it used this relationship to assign to
the school more expansive disciplinary powers than it had been willing
to recognize in T.L.O. while, at the same time, limiting the schools' re-
sponsibilities to protect and preserve students' constitutional rights. The
majority opinion acknowledged school officials have "custodial and tute-
lary" powers, 127 and yet also that they have no duty to protect students
from other students. 128 A student's privacy interest, the Court reasoned,
must therefore be viewed in light of "what is appropriate for children in
school"'129 and the significant power that school officials must wield 130
in order to carry out what is "appropriate" for students. Furthermore, the
Court indicated that the specific circumstances of this case, drug-testing
in the context of school athletics, gave rise to an even further diminished
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment because, according
to the Court, "sports are not for the bashful."' 3' Thus, in the Court's
estimation, the first factor - Acton's privacy interest -was not particu-
larly weighty.
The majority opinion also assigned little weight to Acton's side of
the balance in considering the second factor, the character of the intru-
sion, for two reasons. First, the drug-testing policy did little more than
mandate something Acton would have to do anyway, urinate in a public
restroom. 32 Second, the school used the results only to decide whether
students could participate in sports, not for aiding criminal prosecution or
126 Id.
127 Id. at 656.
128 Id. at 655. This rejection of a duty to protect one student from harming another ap-
peared as only dicta in the decision, but the majority, with its emphasis on "custodial" power,
probably sought to signal that a corresponding duty to protect did not arise. School officials
throughout the United States had already encountered numerous lawsuits alleging such a duty
after the Court decided DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489
U.S. 189 (1989). Though the DeShaney Court held that government officials did not have a
Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect a child from an abusive parent, id. at 197, lawsuits
followed when litigants claimed that schools - public actors - "created" the harm that stu-
dents faced while in the school's custody. See, e.g., Linda E. Fisher, Anatomy of an Affirma-
tive Duty to Protect: 42 U.S.C. Section 1986, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 461, 468 (1999)
(collection of critical commentary on DeShaney decision); Landra Ewing, Note, When Going
to School Becomes an Act of Courage: Students Need Protection from Violence, 36 BRANDEIS
J. FAM. L. 627, 630-33, 642-44 (1997) (citing these lawsuits and criticizing the Court's failure
to comprehend the schools' custodial duties); see also Katherine Lush, Note, Expanding the
Rights of Children in Public Schools, 26 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 95, 117-22,
126 (2000) (rejecting DeShaney's narrow view and advocating a broader reading of students'
rights in the public schools, including a "right to attend a safe school" in order to promote
effective education).
129 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656.
130 Id. at 655-56.
131 Id. at 657.
132 Id. at 658.
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administering "internal disciplinary" policies, thereby minimizing the in-
trusion on Acton's already limited privacy rights. 33
On the other side of the balance was the Court's third factor - the
school's interest in dealing with drugs in sports. Although in its first
drug-testing case, the Court labeled the government's interest in con-
ducting the tests "compelling,"' 134 the Vernonia Court declared that
"compelling" really meant "important enough to justify [a] particular
search."' 135 By interpreting "compelling" in this less restrictive manner,
the Court easily determined that the three stated purposes of Vernonia's
drug-testing program ("to prevent student athletes from using drugs, to
protect their health and safety, and to provide drug users with assistance
programs") 136 outweighed the students' Fourth Amendment privacy
interest.
In interpreting the fourth factor, the Court determined that the
school district's drug-testing policy was an effective means of deterring
drug use by athletes, one that not only helped them but other students as
well; the athletes avoided the physical and psychological harm of drug
use and other students were spared the classroom "disruption" caused by
drug-using students.1 37 The Court also explained that the means used by
school officials need not be the least intrusive to further the school's
interest in deterring drug use.'38 The Court stated that requiring school
officials to have reasonable suspicion of drug use would undermine the
relationship between school officials and students, 139 making officials
adversaries and subjecting them to lawsuits challenging decisions to im-
pose drug-testing on particular students. 40
On balance the Court thus held that drug-testing athletes under the
particular "special needs" presented by the facts of the Vernonia case
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Even though Vernonia
involved group suspicionless searches and T.L.O. involved searches di-
rected at a particular student, both decisions relied heavily upon the pre-
sumption of diminished constitutional protection for students and the
characterization of schools as a place with "special needs" in deciding
Fourth Amendment reasonableness.
133 Id.
134 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989).
135 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661.
136 Id. at 650.
137 Id. at 661-62.
138 Id. at 663.
139 Id. at 663-64.
140 Id. The dissent noted that teachers necessarily play an adversarial role when determin-
ing whether students have violated other aspects of a school's conduct code and selecting
appropriate disciplinary responses for these infractions. Id. at 677 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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C. THE "SPECIAL NEEDS" DOCTRINE UNDER T.L.O. AND VERNONIA
In balancing interests, the majority opinions in Vernonia and T.L.O.
examined both the common law and modem practices. In doing so, the
Court created a new framework for Fourth Amendment analysis, the
"special needs" doctrine, in an effort to further and support sound educa-
tional practices in the public schools.' 4
In each case, the Court discerned "special needs" justifying searches
to further an important purpose other than criminal investigation that,
according to the Court, school officials could not fulfill using the more
stringent requirements of a warrant, probable cause, or as in Vernonia,
even reasonable suspicion. T.L.O. applied an "implicit" "special needs"
doctrine but, by the time Vernonia came to the Court, the Court had
already applied the doctrine in other similar contexts. Therefore, the ex-
plicit invocation of "special needs" analysis in Vernonia was hardly
surprising.
What was startling was the Supreme Court's re-characterization of
the role of the common law in deciding reasonableness. 142 Had the com-
mon law revealed a "clear" practice as to the reasonableness of searching
public school students, the Vernonia Court would have considered this a
dispositive answer to the Fourth Amendment inquiry. 143 This analytical
sea-change - the movement from considering the common law as only
one factor in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to a potentially con-
trolling one - is a perplexing twist that has been criticized in subsequent
opinions 144 and not always followed.
In applying the Fourth Amendment to the public schools, the Su-
preme Court did not determine that common law was controlling; as ap-
plied, the common law offered only limited guidance in discerning the
reasonableness of student drug-testing. 145 Nevertheless, the common
141 Although historically fostering education has been left to local school boards, the
Court may still influence school policies as necessary to interpret and enforce the Bill of
Rights, of which the Fourth Amendment is a part. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(I Cranch) (1803); but see Andre R. Imbrogno, Corporal Punishment in America's Public
Schools and the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child. A Case for Nonratification, 29
J.L. & EoUc. 125, 143 (2000) (noting that even though the United States "remains one of the
few industrialized nations which continues to permit corporal punishment in their public
schools," local schools should decide whether to use this type of punishment). Imbrogno,
however, did not mention the Fourth Amendment as a possible basis for students' personal
security claims; he referred only to substantive due process and equal protection claims under
the Fourteenth Amendment, and cited the First Amendment as a novel basis.
142 See supra notes 110-120 and accompanying text.
143 See supra note 11l and accompanying text.
144 See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 311 n.3 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(stating "we have never restricted ourselves to a two-step Fourth Amendment approach
wherein the privacy and governmental interests at stake must be considered only if 18th-cen-
tury common law 'yields no answer'").
145 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652.
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law affected its "special needs" balancing analysis: the opinion relied on
common-law practices to justify restricting students' Fourth Amendment
rights and privacy rights. 146 Yet, in keeping with the Court's acknowl-
edgment that school officials have "tutelary" as well as "custodial" pow-
ers, any assessment of what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
must consider what school officials "teach" students by their actions.
Under the "special needs" doctrine, school officials must use their custo-
dial power only as a means to educate students. This focus on educa-
tional purpose is at the core of the "special needs" doctrine.
III. PHYSICAL DISCIPLINE AND PROCESS FOR STUDENTS:
INGRAHAM V. WRIGHT
The unique educational requirements of public schools also figured
strongly in the Court's infamous decision of Ingraham v. Wright.' 47
Even though Ingraham did not raise a Fourth Amendment claim chal-
lenging the school officials' use of corporal punishment, 148 the case nev-
ertheless reveals the Court's perspective on public schools and its
reliance on 1970s educational philosophy. Because public educational
practices have changed dramatically since the 1970s, school officials and
courts should now reexamine Ingraham and consider students' interests
in personal security as safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment.
Ingraham involved a constitutional challenge to a Florida junior
high school's policy of striking students for violating school rules. 149
Even though teachers were to consult the principal before hitting unruly
students, they often did not' 50 and, after two students received large
bruises from repeated strikes with a wooden paddle, their parents filed
suit. 15 1 The issues were narrow: whether a school's failure to provide
students with process before corporally punishing them violated the
Fourteenth Amendment and whether the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and
unusual punishments" clause 5 2 applied to the act of physical punishment
in the public schools. 153 The majority's opinion resolved both issues by
examining the historical and contemporary use of corporal punishment 54
and the Framer's intentions regarding the issue. 155 Ingraham held that
146 See supra notes 115-120 and accompanying text.
147 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
148 The students did not invoke the Fourth Amendment as a basis for the suit. Id. at 673
n.42. Nor did the Court grant review of their claim under the substantive due process compo-
nent of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 659 n. 12.
149 430 U.S. 651, 655-57 (1977).
150 Id. at 657.
151 Id. at 653 n.I.
152 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
153 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 653.
154 Id. at 559-63, 674-78.
155 Id. at 664-70, 672-74 (1977).
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the Eighth Amendment did not apply to the school's substantive decision
to hit students for punishment' 56 and that the Fourteenth Amendment did
not require "pre-hitting" process.' 57 In rejecting both claims, the Court
nevertheless had much to say about school officials' authority over
students.
A. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: THE COMMON LAW MEETS
MODERN TIMES
In analyzing corporal punishment in the public schools, the Ingra-
ham Court interpreted the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in light of
its version of common-law history as well as contemporary standards.
Drawing liberally on legal historian William Blackstone's Commentaries
which "catalogued among the 'absolute rights of individuals' the right to
security from the corporal insults of menaces, assaults, beating, and
wounding,"' 158 the Court nonetheless distinguished the public school con-
text and recognized a teacher's authority to "corporal[ly] insult" a stu-
dent as "moderate correction."'159 Thus, the use of physical force did not
offend Blackstone's maxim when it furthered a student's education. The
Court also looked at the 1970s practice of corporal punishment in the
classroom. 160 When the Court decided Ingraham, twenty-one states "au-
thorized the moderate use of corporal punishment in public schools' 6'
and, even though "[p]rofessional and pubic opinion [was] sharply di-
vided on the practice, and [had] been for more than a century,"'162 the
Court discerned "no trend toward its elimination." 163 Further, in contrast
to the common law, the Ingraham majority implicitly rejected the in loco
parentis doctrine by holding that a teacher's authority in the classroom
did not derive from parental authority,' 64 and it noted that, even though
one state required parental consent before striking students, such consent
was not constitutionally required.165
156 Id. at 671.
157 Id. at 683.
158 Id. at 661 (quoting I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134).
159 Id. (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *120).
160 The opinion did, however, note the "general abandonment" of the common-law prac-
tice of corporal punishment among prison populations and mentioned applying "'evolving
standards of decency'"'to prisoners' personal security claims under the Eighth Amendment.
Id. at 660, 668 n.36 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
161 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 663.
162 Id. at 660-61.
163 Id. at 661.
164 Id. at 662 (stating that "the concept of parental delegation has been replaced by the
view - more consonant with compulsory education laws - that the State itself may impose
such corporal punishment as is reasonably necessary 'for the proper education of the child and
for the maintenance of group discipline'") (citing I F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS,
§ 3.20, at 292 (1956)).
165 Id. at 662 n.22.
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B. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: APPLYING THE ELDRIDGE
TEST
After thus discarding the Eighth Amendment claim, the Court ap-
plied the classic three-part balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge to de-
termine what process the Fourteenth Amendment requires before school
officials may strike students: (1) the student's interest in personal secur-
ity; (2) the "risk of an erroneous deprivation" of personal security and
"probable value" of the requested safeguard; and (3) the state's interests
in not having the safeguard.' 66 In assessing the first factor, the Court
acknowledged students' "strong interest in procedural safeguards that
minimize the risk of wrongful punishment"1 67 but also observed that the
common law only permitted students to sue where infliction of corporal
punishment in the classroom was unjustified - "in light of its pur-
pose." 16 8 The Court carefully sketched the contours of the common-law
privilege that permitted the use of force for "moderate correction" in fur-
therance of education, 169 but rendered conduct outside of that privilege
actionable under state tort law. 170 With regard to the second factor, the
Court determined the risk of error in disciplining students to be "insignif-
icant" because school officials directly observe the unruly students.' 7'
Likening the physical disciplining of unruly students to the warrantless
arrest of suspects by police officers, 172 the majority held that more pro-
cess was unnecessary because the open nature of the school system acts
as a check on potential abuse and because, in any event, "there was a low
incidence of abuse."' 7 3 As a result, the second factor weighed in favor of
the school's policy.
The majority's evaluation of the final factor, the state's interest in
denying process to students subject to corporal punishment, relied upon
two key assumptions. First, the Court assumed that physical punishment
was an effective disciplinary tool, one that school officials might forego
if they had to provide process before hitting students.' 74 Although the
Court noted that many people would welcome the "elimination or curtail-
ment of corporal punishment ... as a societal advance,"1 75 it viewed the
states' physical punishment policies as "reaffirm[ing]" the common-law
166 Id. at 675 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
167 Id. at 676.
168 Id. at 675-76.
169 Id. at 675.
170 Id. at 676 n.45.
171 Id. at 677-78.
172 ld at 679-80.
173 Id. at 682.
174 Id. at 680.
175 Id, at 681.
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practice of allowing corporal punishment. 176 Second, the Court assumed
that teachers needed to corporally punish students quickly to be effec-
tive 77 and that students' "anxiety" would increase if school officials
delayed the imposition of punishment by "interposing procedural safe-
guards."' 78 In light of these assumptions, the Court determined that pre-
hitting process would be a "significant intrusion into an area of primary
educational responsibility."' 179
C. INGRAHAM'S RATIONALE
In deciding that the Fourteenth Amendment only required post-hit-
ting process for physically disciplined students, the Ingraham Court dis-
tinguished between two disciplinary remedies - hitting and
suspensions. 80 Pre-deprivation process is generally preferred before of-
ficials may suspend students. 18' The differing constitutional treatment
may be related to the Court's view of physical discipline: a quick slap
may keep the student in school, under control and learning, while a sus-
pension results in ejection and loss of educational instruction. The In-
graham Court's bright-line rule of allowing physical punishment with
only post-hitting process avoided burdening schools with the tedious and
uncertain task of determining the appropriate amount of process justified
by the degree of physical harm inflicted in a given instance, an approach
whose "impracticability" the Court found "self-evident" and illustrative
of "the hazards of ignoring the traditional solution of the common
law." 82 In short, the Court examined historical and contemporaneous
practices among the states in rejecting any protection for physically pun-
ished students under the Eighth Amendment and in deciding the scope of
students' procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. However, the Ingraham decision did explicitly leave open the
question of whether physical punishment may violate the substantive due
process component of the Fourteenth Amendment. 183 In light of the
Court's more recent personal security jurisprudence, such claims would
fall under the Fourth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth
Amendment. ' 84
176 Id.
177 Id. at 681 (indicating that teachers disciplining students "sometimes require immediate
effective action").
178 Id. at 681 n.51.
179 Id. at 682.
180 Id. at 678 n.46.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 682 n.55.
183 Id. at 659 n.12.
184 See Urbonya, supra note 1 at 51-55.
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IV. CONTEXTUAL BALANCING IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
FORCE TO FURTHER SAFETY AND
FORCE TO PUNISH
Modem courts adjudicating students' Fourth Amendment personal
security claims must draw upon the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment
precedents examining police officers' use of physical force, (Tennessee
v. Garner and Graham v. Connor), school officials' searches of students,
(New Jersey v. T.L.O. and Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton), and
the constitutionally mandated process owed to physically punished stu-
dents (Ingraham v. Wright). This article synthesizes these cases and con-
tends that the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is
rooted in contextual balancing, with what constitutes Fourth Amendment
reasonableness depending upon the particular educational practice at
issue.
Grappling with numerous scenarios in which police officers use
physical force to control and subdue suspects, the nation's courts, not
surprisingly, have reached conflicting results when examining similar
facts.' 8 5 Many of the of the same problems surface when analyzing
school officials' use of physical force in the public schools. As dis-
cussed above, in defining Fourth Amendment reasonableness for the
classroom, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence suggests many factors: the
nature of school officials' authority over students; the role of history,
including common-law practices and modem practices; educational the-
ory, which includes assessing harm to students and the learning environ-
ment as a result of using physical force; and the need to defer to school
officials' decisions. Analysis of the Supreme Court's Fourth Amend-
ment decisions suggests that the Constitution affords school officials
broad deference in using physical force to maintain school safety, but
that physical force to punish is per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.
A. SCHOOL OFFICIALS' "CUSTODIAL" AND "TUTELARY" AUTHORITY:
DIFFERENT FROM PARENTAL AUTHORITY
The Supreme Court's precedents distinguish between parental au-
thority to use physical force and school officials' authority in educating
students. According to the Supreme Court, school officials have both
"custodial" and "tutelary" powers. When school officials searched stu-
dents in both T.L0. and Vernonia, the searches were to further the
schools' mission - education. In these Fourth Amendment decisions,
185 See, e.g., Kathryn R. Urbonya, Dangerous Misperceptions: Protecting Police Officers,
Society, and the Fourth Amendment Right to Personal Security, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
623, 648-73 (1995) (highlighting numerous differences in how courts determine whether po-
lice officers' use of force is reasonable).
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the Court noted that schools officials have power exceeding the powers
given to them under the doctrine of in loco parentis. The Court high-
lighted that compulsory education laws made the school officials func-
tion as state actors, not parents. As a result of exerting state, not
parental, authority, school officials could not claim the "immunity"'186
that parents had or act free from "constitutional restraints." 187 In addi-
tion, the Court in dicta stated, "parental approval of corporal punishment
is not constitutionally required."' 88
Whether school officials have acted constitutionally reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment depends upon how the measures further
the schools' educational goal. School officials have "custodial" power in
order to educate students. Even though many states ask parents to sign
consent forms regarding school activities, school officials still have au-
thority that differs from parents because of their status as state actors. 189
186 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337.
187 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655.
188 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 n.22 (1977); see also Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J
v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 681 n.1 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing footnote in
Ingraham).
189 Parents have frequently invoked religious beliefs to justify the use of corporal punish-
ment. See, e.g., PHILIP GREVEN, SPARE THE ROD: THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS PUNISHMENT AND
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF PHYSICAL ABUSE 46-81 (1991). Greven explored the relig-
ious justifications that "fundamentalist protestants" have used when explaining the striking of
their children. Parents often asserted a need to break the will of a child in order to save the
child from "eternal punishment." Id. See also Christopher G. Ellison & Darren E. Sherkat,
Conservative Protestantism and Support for Corporal Punishment, 58 AM. Soc. REV. 131, 131
(1993). Ellison and Sherkat, who are professors of sociology, examined the normative support
for corporal punishment and noted its relationship to parents' religious beliefs:
[T]he disproportionate support for corporal punishment among Conservative Protes-
tants derives largely from the distinctive epistemological commitments implied by
the doctrine of biblical "literalism," along with two related ideological orientations:
(1) a view of human nature as sinful and prone to egoism, and (2) a heightened
sensitivity to issues of sin and punishment.
Id. Although they stated that what constitutes a "'literal' interpretation of the Bible remains
hotly disputed," id. at 132, they use the term "Conservative Protestant" to refer to an individual
who focuses on "the certainty and legitimacy of biblical truth," linked with "issues of authority
and obedience." Id. They also noted that psychologist James Dobson, the founder of Focus on
the Family, justifies the use of corporal punishment by relying on his "Conservative Protes-
tant" religious beliefs rather than his training as a psychologist in determining what constitutes
"good discipline." Id.
Other sociologists have described this religious view in support of corporal punishment as
"sacralized" violence, aimed at "fostering the child's well being in this world, and, ultimately,
the next." Christopher G. Ellison & John P. Bartkowski, Religion and the Legitimation of
Violence: Conservative Protestantism and Corporal Punishment, in THE WEB OF VIOLENCE:
FROM INTERPERSONAL TO GLOBAL 48 (Jennifer Turpin & Lester R. Kurtz eds., 1997). These
sociologists effectively described how such religious beliefs are not in any sense linked to a
"true" interpretation of biblical truth, but rather tied to a particular religious institution's be-
liefs, which its members then adopt:
Although many conservative Protestants would disagree, many observers argue that
the Bible, like any text, contains passages that permit multiple readings. Thus, it is
important to note that understandings of scripture -"inerrant" or otherwise - do
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Yet, school officials who have signed parental consent forms in hand
would naturally contend that a parent's consent to physically discipline
the child would make the use of force per se reasonable.' 90 Such an
argument is not frivolous, but it nevertheless would miss the essence of
the Court's decisions - school officials are state actors. 19' The Court
assigned this constitutional status to school officials performing the pub-
lic function of teaching for an important reason: school officials must be
free to fulfill the state law's command to educate youth. 192 When stu-
not emerge in a mechanical fashion from the solitary study and reflection of individ-
uals .... Rather, scriptural readings are social products, generated and disseminated
within interpretive communities. Members of interpretive communities make certain
a priori assumptions about a given text, and they adopt certain ground rules to define
the boundaries of acceptable practice. These assumptions and conventions shape
their subsequent readings of concrete passages, ruling out alternative understandings.
Id. at 49.
190 Many scholars, however, have reexamined how we discuss the relationship between
children and parents. See, e.g., James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare:
Debunking the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1379 (1994) (advocating
that courts "dispense with the notion of parental rights altogether"). Professor Dwyer argued
that child-rearing matters should focus on the interests of children:
Abrogating parents' rights would, however, substantially alter the way that courts
analyze conflicts between parents and the larger community over child-rearing.
Rather than balancing parents' rights against state interests in the care and education
of children, as presently occurs, judges would decide these conflicts solely on the
basis of children's welfare interests. Doing so would be likely, in turn, to alter the
precise limits of parental freedom and authority and to shift the boundary between
permissible and impermissible state interventions.
Id. at 1376. Professor Orentlicher has also advocated for a "child's" perspective, stating that
we have mistakenly afforded parents the opportunity to strike children because "we view cor-
poral punishment from the perspective of parents" by "undervalu[ing] children and
overvalu[ing] pain." David Orentlicher, Spanking and Other Corporal Punishment of Chil-
dren by Parents: Overvaluing Pain, Undervaluing Children, 35 HouSTON L. REV. 147, 185
(1998). In addition, Professor Bitensky has advocated that state laws should no longer recog-
nize a privilege for parents to strike their children as a form of "discipline." Bitensky, infra
note 197, at 360. She noted that the United States is one of the few nations to still allow this
inhumane practice. id. at 361.
191 See, e.g., Joan L. Neisser, School Officials: Parents or Protectors? The Contribution
of a Feminist Perspective, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1507, 1510 (1993) (rejecting the doctrine of in
loco parentis as applied to teachers). Professor Neisser revealed an important problem if one
were to view public school teachers as acting as parents: they would be able to physically
punish students, asserting the parents' privilege at common law, but have no current duty to
protect students in their custody. Id. For her, viewing teachers as parents would be adopting
an "outmoded" "partriarchal model of the family." Id.
192 See, e.g., Anne Proffitt Dupre, A Study in Double Standards, Discipline, and the Dis-
abled Student, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1, 77 (2000) (rejecting the notion of public school teachers
acting as parents because of their duty to consider the good of all students, not what is good for
a particular child as would a parent). In examining the difficult question of how public school
teachers may legally discipline disabled students in light of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(A)-(C) (Supp. 1997), Professor Dupre described the
possible and common conflict between parents and public school teachers:
[T]he parent of a disabled child is interested in the welfare of his or her child, not
that of the many other students in the community of learning. Professor Stephen
Gillers, in describing wnat he calls "liberal parentalism," states that parental control
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dents enroll in public, as opposed to private, schools, the state guides the
actions of these school officials.1 93 Parents are free to enroll their chil-
dren in private schools or even to "home school" them. 194 In the public
school, due process requirements apply; they do not in private schools.
The unique context of the public schools, in which officials exercise
neither criminal law enforcement powers nor parental powers but rather
"custodial" and "tutelary" powers, 9 5 thus complicates the Fourth
Amendment analysis of reasonableness. The reasonableness of physical
force becomes intertwined with the school's power to exercise limited
custody and requires an "objective"'' 96 examination of whether the force
used was reasonable under the particularized circumstances confronting a
over a child's education is "presumed superior" because "the fallible human agents
through whom government must act are less likely to do what is good for other
people's children than fallible individual parents are to do what is good for their
own." But even if a particular request is in the best interest of one particular child, it
may not be in the best interest of other students and their parents, who do not have a
voice in the matter .... To quote Justice Douglas, "It is the future of the student,
not the future of the parents, that is of primary importance."
Id. at 77-78 (citations omitted). She thus viewed teachers as the state's, not parents', agents in
making educational decisions for the class.
193 See, e.g., WILLIAM W. CUTLER III, PARENTS AND SCHOOLS 206-07 (2000) (detailing
the historical conflicts between public school teachers and parents and advocating that teachers
and parents work together). Cutler described this authority battle:
Parents may not be the teacher's natural enemy, but they are usually unwelcome in
the classroom. Armed with profession certificates and advanced degrees, educators
believe that they have the authority to manage parental inquiries and even dismiss
complaints about the judgments they make or the methods they use. Such autonomy
carries a high price, justifying parental ignorance, apathy, and detachment.
Id. at 2. Cutler asserted that public schools would function better if parents and teachers
recognized a "symbiotic relationship" with the interest of children placed first. Id. at 2,
199-207.
194 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER J. KLICKA, THE RIGHT TO HOME SCHOOL: A GUIDE TO THE
LAW ON PARENTS' RIGHTS IN EDUCATION 2 (2d ed. 1998). Klicka noted that when states first
established compulsory public education, "home-schooling virtually died out." Id. He dis-
cerned the re-birth of home-schooling in the 1980s, noting two primary reasons: the parents'
Christian religious beliefs and their dissatisfaction with the "academic and moral decline in the
public schools." Id. at 2-3. The author, clearly in favor of home schooling, discussed the turf
battle between public educators and parents. At one point, he quoted a public school teacher
who referred to home-schooling as "a form of child-abuse" because of the social isolation
home-schooled children experience. Id. at 24. He maintained that this "opposition" "seeks to
regulate home schooling out of existence or at least into conformity" through excessive state
regulation. Id. at 26-27. See also Louis FISCHER, DAVID SCHIMMEL, & CYNTHIA KELLY,
TEACHERS AND THE LAW 434 (1999) (noting that all states allow parents to school their chil-
dren at home if they meet the "requirements of their particular state"); see generally Dupre,
supra note 192, at 85 (noting that many parents chose private schools because of discipline
problems in the public schools).
195 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655-56.
196 See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (stating that "the question is
whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circum-
stances confronting them").
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given school official and whether it furthered the purpose for which it
was used.
B. LEGAL AND EDUCATIONAL PRACTICES AT COMMON LAW AND
TODAY
In making this objective assessment, the Supreme Court's opinions,
both in the policing and school contexts, suggest that courts must con-
sider past and present legal and educational practices. The Court finds
the common law's conception of reasonableness informative, though
Fourth Amendment reasonableness cannot be entirely equated with his-
torical common-law practices because common-law principles necessa-
rily fail to reflect the present-day realities of policing and education. In
crafting its reasonableness jurisprudence, the Court therefore also consid-
ers modern practices, deferring in part to the judgments of the experts in
particular areas.
The common law provided little protection for the personal security
of children, whether at home or in school. As numerous scholars have
noted, historically both children and women were chattel197 - the prop-
erty of the father and husband, who could beat them almost to death. 198
Private tutors at common law had the authority to use physical force for
"moderate correction,"' 99 but "unjustifiable" force was actionable be-
cause it exceeded the teacher's privilege. 200 Contemporary educational
and legal practices also shape the Fourth Amendment standard of reason-
ableness. When the Court decided Ingraham v. Wright in 1977, women
197 See, e.g., ROBERT WHEELER LANE, BEYOND THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: FREE SPEECH
AND THE INCULCATION OF VALUES 18 (1995) (stating that "[f]rom 1870 to 1920, a parens
patriae doctrine, giving legal authority to the state to control and supervise children, displaced
their chattel legal status"). Lane discerned that there was "a transfer of broad discretionary
power to the state," in light of new state restrictions -"compulsory-education laws," limits on
"child labor," and the "creation of a juvenile justice system." Id. In short, "children became,
in effect, a newly regulated industry." Id.; Susan H. Bitensky, Spare the Rod, Embrace Our
Humanity: Toward a New Legal Regime Prohibiting Corporal Punishment of Children, 31 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 439 (1998) (stating that "[c]orporal punishment of children, which
dates back to antiquity, reflects children's continued classification as parental property"); Su-
san D. Hawkins, Note, Protecting the Rights and Interests of Competent Minors in Litigated
Medical Treatment Disputes, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2075, 2076 (1996) (stating that "[alt one
time, children in the United States were regarded simply as chattel of their parents, or, more
accurately, of their fathers"; adding that the "law relating to children focused not on their
rights, but on the rights of adults with respect to their children").
198 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Civil Rights Reform in Historical Perspective: Regulating
Marital Privacy, in REDEFINING EQUALITY 29, 31 (Neal Devins & Davison M. Douglas eds.,
1998) (describing the husband's authority to ."restrain" his wife through "domestic chastise-
ment" in much the "same moderation that a man is allowed to correct his apprentices or chil-
dren"). See also ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 132-38 (1997) (describing the use of
patriarchal violence as a means of controlling women).
199 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 661 (1977) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I
COMMENTARIES * 134).
200 Id.
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were gradually becoming legally autonomous individuals - retaining
both their property 20' and names after marriage,20 2 working in a variety
of professions, 20 3 and paying alimony when necessary. 20 4 But society
did not afford a similar autonomy to children; parents continued to con-
trol many important decisions. 20 5
Thus, when the Ingraham Court looked at "modern" practices of
corporal punishment in schools, the 1970s legal landscape still reflected
the historical pattern of diminished personal security interests for chil-
dren.20 6 The Court canvassed the states' corporal punishment policies in
analyzing whether the Fourteenth Amendment required pre-hitting
procedures:
Of the 23 States that have addressed the problem
through legislation, 21 have authorized the moderate use
of corporal punishment in public schools. Of these
201 See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (holding unconstitutional a stat-
ute that allowed husbands to dispose of mutually owned property without their wives'
consent).
202 See, e.g., Priscilla Ruth MacDougall, The Right of Women to Name Their Children, 3
L. & INEQUALITY: J. THEORY & PRACTICE 91, 96 n.9 (1985) (stating that in the 1970s courts
finally recognized "the right of women to chose their own names").
203 See generally Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion) (hold-
ing that federal law drawing different presumptions of dependencies for male and female
spouses violated equal protection). In Frontiero, Justice Brennan discussed our nation's his-
tory of sex discrimination, stating society had justified this discrimination by its notion of
"'romantic paternalism,' which ... put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage." Id. at 684.
As an example of this cage, he looked to the 1873 case of Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
130 (1873), which denied women the right to practice law by relying on stereotypes and relig-
ious perspectives to justify discrimination:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper ti-
midity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of
the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which is
founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of wo-
manhood ....
... [The] paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign
offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.
Id. (quoting Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141).
204 See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (holding unconstitutional a state law that
required only men, not women, to provide alimony).
205 See, e.g., Parham v. J.R. et al., 442 U.S. 584, 616 (1979) (rejecting a facial procedural
due process challenge to a state statute permitting parents to admit children to mental health
hospitals, subject to evaluation by professionals). But cf id. at 625 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(stating that "it ignores reality to assume blindly that parents act in their children's best inter-
ests when making commitment decisions and when waiving their children's due process
rights").
206 See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child": Meyer and Pierce and
the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1002 (1992) (arguing that "our attach-
ment to [a] property-based notion of the private child cuts off a more fruitful consideration of
the rights of all children to safety, nurture, and stability, to a voice, and to membership in the
national family").
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States only a few have elaborated on the common-law
test of reasonableness, typically providing for approval
or notification of the child's parents, or for infliction of
punishment by the principal or in the presence of an
adult witness. Only two States, Massachusetts and New
Jersey, have prohibited all corporal punishment in their
public schools. Where the legislatures have not acted,
the state courts have uniformly preserved the common-
law rule permitting teachers to use reasonable force in
disciplining children in their charge. 20 7
In short, the Court found "contemporary approval of reasonable corporal
punishment, '20 8 and "discern[ed] no trend toward its elimination. '20 9
However, a survey of the same state laws today would reveal quite
different results. In contrast to the 1970s, when twenty-one states au-
thorized teachers to physically punish students, today only two states di-
rectly grant school officials the authority to use bodily punishment.210
Another state requires parents or guardians to consent before the striking
of their children is permitted. 211 And, in a dramatic reversal, nineteen
states and the charter schools in the District of Columbia now expressly
forbid corporal punishment.212
Such statutes are analogous to the regulations of at least thirty-four
states that ban foster parents from administering corporal punishment
under any circumstances 213 and provide further support for the notion
207 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1977).
208 Id. at 663.
209 Id. at 661.
210 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 844 (West 1998) (law does not prohibit a "parent, teacher
or other person from using ordinary force as a means of discipline, including but not limited to
spanking, switching or paddling"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-64103 (1996) (permitting any
teacher or principal to use corporal punishment in a reasonable manner to maintain discipline
and order).
211 UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-802 (1997).
212 ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 07.010(c) (1998); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49001 (West
1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A- 1141 (1999); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/24-24, 5/34-84a
(West 1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 280.21 (West 1999); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-306(a)
(1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37G (1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1312 (West
1997); MINN. STAT. § 121A.58 (1999 Supp.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-4-302(3) (1999); NEB.
REv. STAT. 79-295 (1996); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.. § 392.465 (Michie 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 18A:6-1 (West 1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.250 (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16 § 1161a(c)
(West 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-279.1 (Michie 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 28A.150.300 (West 1997); W. VA. CODE § 18A-5-1(d) (1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 188.31
(West Supp. 1998); D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-2817(f) (1998).
213 ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R6-5-5909E.4(e), (h) (2001) (stating "[n]o child ... shall be
subjected to .. .corporal punishment inflicted in any manner upon the body"; also banning
"[plunishment connected with functions of living, such as sleeping or eating"); Ark. Dep't
Human Services Reg., Standards for Approval of Family Foster Homes § 139(c)((5) (a), (b),
(c), (e), (f) (1999) (stating that "[p]hysical punishment inflicted in any manner" is unaccept-
able; banning "washing mouth out with soap, taping or obstructing a child's mouth, placing
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painful or unpleasant tasting substances in mouth, on lips," "hitting, pinching, pulling hair,
slapping, kicking twisting arm, forced fixed body positions..."; also prohibiting "[d]enial of
meals, clothing, shelter" and "[a]ssignment of extremely strenuous exercise or work" and
"[liocked in isolation of any kind"); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 87072 (a)(3), (6) (2001) (stat-
ing that "[e]ach child [has a] personal right[ ]... to be free from corporal or unusual punish-
ment," and "[nlot to be locked in any room, building, or facility premises by day or night"); 12
COLO. CODE REGS. § 2509-6 (1998) (stating that "[t]he caregiver must not use... corporal or
other harsh punishment, including but not limited to pinching, shaking, spanking, punching,
biting, kicking, rough handling, hair pulling, or any humiliating or frightening method of disci-
pline" ); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 17a-150-109 (c) (2001) (stating that "[floster ... parents
shall not use ...corporal punishment, including but not limited to spanking, cursing, or
threats"); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65C-13.010.5.(e), (f), (h), (1) (2001) (stating that "substi-
tute care parents must not use corporal punishment of any kind"; also banning the punishments
of "us[ing] soap to wash out the mouth, eating hot sauces or peppers, placing in hot water,
kneeling on stones..."; also prohibited are withholding "meals, clothing, or shelter as a form
of punishment" as well as assigning chores that "involve physical exercise so excessive as to
endanger the child's health, or so extensive as to impinge on time set aside for school work,
sleeping, or eating"); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. r. 290-2-5-.14(b)(2), (3), (4), (9) (2000) (stating
that "corporal punishment" "shall not be used"; also banning as punishment the "[d]enial of
meals or hydration," "sleep," and "shelter, clothing, or essential personal needs" ); HAW. AD-
MIN. RULES § 17-890-25(a) (1999) (stating that "[n]o child shall be subjected to physical pun-
ishment or any action which would endanger the child's physical or emotional well-being");
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 402.21(c), (d), (f), (g), (h) (2001) (stating that "[n]o child shall be
subjected to corporal punishment"; adding that "[r]easonable physical force may be used to
restrain a child in order to prevent injury to the child, injury to others, the destruction of
property, or extremely disruptive behavior"; also banning as punishment depriving a child of a
meal, clothing, shelter, or sleep; allowing restriction to an unlocked bedroom as punishment if
for a "reasonable period of time"); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 441-113.18(2) (2001) (stating that
the "[u]se of corporal punishment is prohibited"; allowing "reasonable physical force ... to
prevent injury to the child, injury to others, the destruction of property, or extremely disruptive
behavior"); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 28-4-314 (f) (1-3) (2000) (stating that "foster parent ... shall
not use ... physical punishment, including hitting with the hand or any object, yanking arms
or pulling hair"; also "restricting movement by tying or binding" and banning "[c]onfining a
child in a closet, box, or locked area"); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 48, § 1.6109(D)(9)(c)(ii), (v-vii)
(1999) (stating that "[floster parent[ ] shall not use ... corporal punishment"; also banning as
punishments "[p]hysically strenuous exercise or harsh work," "[i]solation in a locked room or
any closet or other enclosed space," and "[ilsolation in an unlocked room for more than one
hour"); CODE ME. R. § 10 148 016(9)(D)(2)(b)(d), (3)(b) (1998) (stating that "[i]n no instance
shall a child be subjected to ... [p]hysical punishment, kneeling, shaking, spanking, or striking
with an object or a blow with the hand"; also prohibiting as punishment the "[d]eprivation of
meals" but allowing for "[pihysical restraint ...when necessary to protect the child from
inflicting injury to themselves or others"); MD. REGS. CODE tit. 07 § 02.25.19(D)(1-3), (6), (8-
10) (2001) (stating that foster parents shall not use "[c]orporal punishment, which includes
physical hitting or any type of physical punishment inflicted in any manner upon the body";
also banning as punishments the following: "[p]hysical exercises, such as running laps or per-
forming pushups"; "[r]equiring or using force to require a child to take an uncomfortable
position such as squatting, bending, or repeated physical movements"; "[d]enial of meals,
clothing, bedding, sleep"; "[blodily shaking"; "[p]lacement in a locked room"; and "[u]se of
mechanical or chemical restraints"); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 110, § 7.111(2) (2001) (stating
that foster parents must sign a written agreement prohibiting "any form of corporal punish-
ment"); MINN. R. 9545.0160 (2000)(D), (F),(I) (prohibiting corporal punishment, which "in-
cludes but is not limited to hitting, slapping, spanking, pinching, shaking, kicking, or biting";
prohibiting the deprivation of "meals" as discipline and "[ilsolation" "in a closet or locked
room"); Miss. REG. I I- 1-003, vol. IV (C)(l-2), Placement Services (1994) (stating that
"[floster parents shall not use corporal punishment" and also barring the "withholding of food"
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as punishment); Mo. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 13, § 40-60.050(5)(A) (2001) (stating that "[floster
parents shall not use corporal punishment"); NEB. ADMIN. R. & REGS. 474-6-003.33G(2)(a-d)
(1999) (stating that foster parents shall never use as discipline the following: "[p]hysical pun-
ishment," "[dienial of necessities," [c]hemical or mechanical restraints" or "threats of physical
punishment"); N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 122C-1.13(b) (2001) (stating that "[tihe foster par-
ent shall not use corporal punishment"); N.M. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 27.3.25.1.5 (2001) (pro-
viding that "[pirohibited forms of discipline include, but are not limited to the following:
corporal punishment such as shaking, spanking, hitting, whipping, or hair or ear pulling; pro-
longed isolation; forced exercise; denial of food, [and] sleep"; also prohibiting locking a child
"in a room or closet"); N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-03-14-05(7)(a) (1999) (stating that "[n]o child
may be punched, spanked, shaken, pinched, roughly handled, or struck with an inanimate
object;" allowing as discipline "gentle physical restraint such as holding"); OHIO ADMIN. CODE
§ 5101:2-7-09(E)(1-3), (6), (8-9), (F), (H) (2001) (stating that a "foster caregiver shall not use
... [pihysical hitting or any type of physical punishment inflicted in any manner upon the
body such as spanking, paddling, punching, shaking, biting, hair pulling, pinching, or rough
handling"; also banning a punishment "[p]hysically strenuous work or exercises"; requiring
"child to take an uncomfortable position, such as squatting or bending, or requiring a foster
child to repeat physical movements when used as a means of punishment"; depriving child of
meals, sleep, "shelter, clothing, bedding, or restroom facilities"; but allowing physical restraint
only by caregivers who have received "specific training" and who use the "least restrictive
physical restraint necessary to control a situation"); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 340:75-17-2(b)(4);
§ 377:10-7-3(13)(A), (D) (1999) (stating that "[plarental substitute authority does not include
the use of corporal punishment"; also banning the withholding of meals as punishment); OR.
ADMIN. R. 413-200-0170(1)(D-E), (G)(a), (c), (e-f), j) (2001) (stating that "[floster parent(s)
will provide positive discipline and guidance but shall not punish foster children"; prohibited
punishments include "[pihysical force or threat of physical force inflicted in any manner upon
the child"; denying "food, clothing, shelter"; assigning "extremely strenuous exercise or
work"; using or threatening to use "restraining devices"; and using a "shower as punishment";
allowing physical restraint only by trained foster care parents); 55 PA. CODE § 3700.63(b)(2),
(5), (8) (2001) (prohibiting "[p]hysical punishment inflicted upon the body"; denying "meals,
clothing, or shelter"; and assigning "physically strenuous exercise or work solely as punish-
ment"); R.I. CODE R. 03-000-021(G)(f) (1998) (stating that foster parents should use "disci-
pline appropriate to the child's age and stage of development and without harsh, humiliating,
or corporal punishment"); 114 S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 114-550 (J)(13)(b) (2001) (prohibiting
"[c]ruel, inhumane and inappropriate discipline," including "but not necessarily limited to the
following: head shaving or any other dehumanizing or degrading act; prolonged/frequent de-
prival of food... ; slapping or shaking"); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. R. 0250-4-2-.07(3)(e)(2-
3), (8) and (4)(b) (2001) (prohibiting "[clorporal punishment"; the "[d]enial of meals, [and]
daily needs"; and assigning "excessive or inappropriate work"; requiring strict monitoring of
isolation techniques); UTAH ADMIN. CODE R501-12-13(B) (2001) (stating that "[floster parents
shall not use, nor permit the use of corporal punishment, physical or chemical restraint, inflic-
tion of bodily harm or discomfort, deprivation of meals . . ."); VT. CODE R. 13-162-
007.324(A)(.1)(.3-.4), .326.1 (1999) (stating that "[a] foster parent shall not subject a foster
child to ... spanking, slapping, hitting, shaking or otherwise engaging in aggressive physical
contact"; also banning required physical discomforts as from prolonged squatting, isolating "in
a closet or locked room," depriving child of "food, water, rest or opportunity for toileting or
bathing" and allowing physical restraint only if force used was "the least amount consistent
with reducing the risk to a level manageable by less restrictive means"); 22 VA. ADMIN. CODE
§ 40-141-150 (2001) (stating that "[t]here shall be no physical punishment, rough play or se-
vere disciplinary action administered to the body such as, but not limited to, spanking, roughly
handling a child, shaking a child, forcing a child to assume an uncomfortable position (e.g.,
standing on one foot, keeping arms raised above or horizontal to the body), restraining to
restrict movement through binding or tying, enclosing in a confined space, or using exercise as
physical punishment"); Wis. ADMIN. CODE HSS § 56.07(5)(c), (f), (h-i) (2001) (prohibiting
"[c]orporal punishment" and banning the deprivation of "meals," the confining "in a closet or
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that school officials serve as state-employed caregivers (like foster-par-
ents) rather than as substitutes for biological parents. Though parents
continue to assert a legal privilege to physically punish their children, 214
locked room" and regulating the use of time-outs in unlocked rooms); CODE OF Wyo. R. 049-
080-005 § 10(t)(iv)(C)(F)(u) (2001) (stating that foster parents may not punish "by shaking,
striking or spanking" children or deprive them of meals; also strictly limiting the use of physi-
cal restraint).
At least five states prohibit certain forms of corporal punishment or limit the use of cor-
poral punishment in certain circumstances. ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 660-5'-28-.02(6)(d)(2)
(2001) (prohibiting "[silapping, striking, or hitting the child's face"; "[h]itting with a fist";
"[s]haking the child"; using "mechanical restraints," "belts, switches, extension cords, etc.");
DEL. CODE Ann. tit. 11, § 468 (1-2) (2000) (stating that use of force by foster parent is justifia-
ble if purpose was for "the prevention or punishment of misconduct," but determining that the
following uses of force are unjustified: "[t]hrowing the child, kicking, burning, cutting, strik-
ing with a closed fist, interfering with breathing . ."); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE
§ 16.06.02.405.03(e)(iii) (2000) (stating that "[nio child may be subjected to cruel, severe,
unusual or unnecessary punishment inflicted upon the body"); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r.
400.194(7) (2000) (stating that "[s]evere corporal punishment shall be a basis for revocation of
license"); S.D. ADMIN. R. 67:42:05:15 (2001) (stating that "[a]ny discipline or control must be
appropriate to the child's age and developmental level"); 40 TEX. ADMIN CODE
§ 720.243(h)(9) (2001) (stating that "[i]f the policy of the foster family home permits spanking
children less than five years old, spanking can only be administered with an open hand on a
child's buttocks or hands").
At least three states require foster caregivers to maintain and submit written records of
incidents involving corporal punishment. MONT. ADMIN. R. 37.97.1011(10) (2001) (stating
that "[a] report shall be completed and sent to the placing agency and licensing social worker
by any foster parent involved in physical punishment"); NEV. ADMIN. CODE ch. 424, § 520(6)
(2001) (stating that "[w]hen serious physical intervention is required by the caregiver in order
to protect the child, others or property, an incident report must be filed within 48 hours to the
division licensing representative and the agency responsible for the child"); 40 TEX. ADMIN
CODE § 720.243(h)(3) (2001) (stating that a "record shall be kept of all physical punishment").
At least two states appear to discourage, but not ban corporal punishment. N.C. ADMIN
CODE tit. 10, r. 41F.0701(e)(2) (2001) (stating that "[c]orporal punishment should be
avoided"); W. VA. CODE ST. R. § 78-2-8.2(c)(6) (1999) (stating that family home study shall
include a record of disciplinary techniques).
In seven states, the statutes and administrative regulations appear to be silent on the issue
of foster parents utilizing corporal punishment: Alaska, Indiana, Kentucky, New Hampshire,
New York, Washington, and West Virginia.
214 See, e.g., Victor I. Vieth, When Parental Discipline is a Crime: Overcoming the De-
fense of Reasonable Force, THE PROSECUTOR, July/Aug. 1998, at 29:
States utilizing the majority rule hold that a parent is not criminally liable for an
assault on a child if the blows to the child's body constitute "reasonable" force and
are administered as a means of discipline .... Under the minority rule a parent is not
criminally liable for an assault on a child even if the force is unreasonable so long as
the parent does not act with malice. Under this rule, an "error in judgment" does not
bring criminal liability.
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a tradition with deep religious roots, 215 many have begun to advocate the
abolition of corporal punishment even in the home.216
Fifteen states now give local school boards discretion to decide
whether to authorize corporal punishment as a means of discipline 217 and
one state recently repealed its prior statute prohibiting corporal punish-
ment.218 In addition, many states have enacted statutes that only gener-
215 See generally Kandice K. Johnson, Crime or Punishment: The Parental Corporal
Punishment Defense - "Reasonable and Necessary, or Excused Abuse?," 1998 U. ILL. L.
REV. 413, 415 (detailing a father's testimony that because the Bible allowed both corporal
punishment and child sacrifice, beating a child is a more "merciful action"). See also Barbara
Finkelstein, A Crucible of Contradictions: Historical Roots of Violence against Children in the
United States, 40 HIST. EDUC. Q. 1, 9 (2000) ("the power of 'old-fashioned' religious tradi-
tions is alive and well in the private unregulated spaces of homes, religious schools, public
schools where corporal punishment is still legally sanctioned, and in a variety of neighborhood
associations where corporal punishment is a daily occurrence and invocations of biblical au-
thority a commonplace justification for it.").
216 See, e.g., Richard Garner, Fundamentally Speaking: Application of Ohio's Domestic
Abuse Violence Law in Parental Discipline Cases: A Parental Perspective, 30 U. TOL. L. REV.
1, 2 (1998) (contending that domestic violence laws and "revisionist judicial interpretation of
the traditional parental privilege of corporal discipline, have begun to erode traditional and
constitutionally-protected concepts of parental primacy and family privacy"); Mary Kay Kear-
ney, Substantive Due Process and Parental Corporal Punishment: Democracy and the Ex-
cluded Child, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 3, 46 (1995) (concluding that parents should not
physically punish children "if they have other less restrictive ways of exercising control over
them"); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Dark Side of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1247, 1257 (1999) (stating that "the ideology of [family] privacy may obscure and con-
done injustice to children, as it obscured and condoned injustice to women"). See generally
Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of
Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, II YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 9, 11 (1999) (stating
that until recently "the European and American legal systems [had] a long history of complic-
ity in - and even approval of - intimate abuse, particularly when perpetrated by men against
their wives and children" and stating that "by the late 1960s and early 1970s, the domestic
violence movement came into full swing and prompted substantial improvement in statutory
law"). In addition, the American Academy of Pediatrics recommended that parents abandon
the use of physical punishment:
Because of the negative consequences of spanking and because it has been demon-
strated to be no more effective than other approaches for managing undesired behav-
ior in children, the American Academy of Pediatrics recommends the parents be
encouraged and assisted in developing methods other than spanking in response to
undesired behavior.
Guidance for Effective Discipline, 101 PEDIATRIcs 723, 726 (1998) (Am. Acad. Pediatrics,
RE9740).
217 ALA. CODE § 16-28A-1 (1995); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-843(B)(2) (West 1999);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-505 (Michie 1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 701 (1999); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 232.27(l)(j) (West 1998); GA. CODE. ANN. § 20-2-730 (1996); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 158.444(1), 158.444(2)(b)(3) (Banks-Baldwin 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.1B
(West Supp. 2000); Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-11-57 (1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 160.261(1)
(2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-5-4.3A, 22-5-4.3B (Michie 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-
390, 115C-391 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.41 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-
260 (Law. Co-op. 1990); Wvo. STAT. ANN § 21-4-308 (Michie 1999).
218 N.D. CENT. CODE 15-47-47 (1999).
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ally refer to a school board's authority to discipline. 21 9 Of these, eight
authorize school officials to use reasonable force to foster a safe and
educational environment. 220 Only two states have failed to enact a stat-
ute addressing the use of force by school officials, whether to physically
punish or to control students. 221
In addition, even in those states that either directly authorize physi-
cal punishment or that grant educational entities the discretion to do so,
school officials may still lose immunity 222 from state-law claims chal-
lenging the use of force where: the force constitutes unreasonable disci-
pline;2 23 the force used is not "administered in good faith . . . [and is]
excessive or unduly severe; '224 the official "exhibit[s] a wanton and will-
ful disregard of human rights or safety"; 225 the force is "excessive ... or
219 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 33-1224 (1995) (stating that "[i]t is the duty of a teacher to
carry out the rules and regulations of the board of trustees in controlling and maintaining
discipline"); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-8.1-5.1-3 (1995) (stating that "[i]n all matters relating to the
discipline and conduct of students, school corporation personnel stand the relation of parents
and guardians to the students of the school corporation"; adding that "school corporation per-
sonnel have the right ... to take any disciplinary action necessary to promote student conduct
that conforms with an orderly and effective educational system").
220 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-703(l)(a) (West 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-18(6) (West 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 106(2) (West 1996); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 627:6(11) (1996); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.10 (McKinney 1999); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, §§ 509(2)(i), 509(2)(ii) (1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-32-2 (Michie 1991); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.62 (West 1994).
221 See generally KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8901(b) and (c) (West 1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 16-12-3 (1956). In contrast to school officials who inflict physical punishment, school offi-
cials who use reasonable force to maintain a safe, non-violent school environment often have
broader immunity under state law. For example, the District of Columbia forbids its charter
schools from using physical punishment but allows officials to use "reasonable force to defend
themselves against physical assaults by the students." D. C. CODE ANN. § 31-2817(f) (1998).
222 Some scholars have criticized states for granting school officials immunity for hitting
students. See Carolyn Peri Weiss, Curbing Violence or Teaching It: Criminal Immunity for
Teachers Who Inflict Corporal Punishment, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1251, 1278-79 (1996) (exten-
sively criticizing Alabama's statute affording civil and criminal immunity for school officials
who use physical force and stating that "teachers are already afforded the same legal protection
as other citizens with regard to self-defense and the defense of others").
223 Utah allows corporal punishment if school officials have consent from the parents or
guardian. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-11-802 (1997). It also grants school officials immunity for
using physical punishment but only if the force would "constitute reasonable discipline."
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-804(l)(a) (1999) (stating that "[c]orporal punishment which
would ... be considered reasonable discipline of a minor ... may not be used as a basis for
any civil or criminal action").
224 Georgia leaves the issue of corporal punishment to the "area, county, or independent
board of education," GA. CODE. ANN. § 20-2-730 (1996), but grants both civil and criminal
immunity to school officials as long as the physical punishment was in "good faith and.., not
excessive or unduly severe." GA. CODE. ANN. § 22-2-732 (1996).
225 In Mississippi, physical punishment by school officials does not constitute "negli-
gence or child abuse" if performed reasonably and in compliance with federal law and "rules
or regulations of the State Board of Education or local school board," Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-
11-57 (2) (1999), but immunity is granted unless the hitting was "in bad faith or with mali-
cious purpose or in a manner exhibiting a wanton and willful disregard of human rights or
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[constitutes] cruel and unusual punishment"; 226 the force used violates
the local school board's disciplinary policy; 227 or where school officials
act with a "malicious purpose. '228 In addition, one state limits school
officials' immunity to punitive damages, as at common-law. 229 Two
others grant discretion to the board of education merely to "[i]nsure any
employee of the school district ... from an act ... within the scope of
employment;230 and others allow indemnification only if the actions do
not constitute "willful, wanton or malicious wrongdoing," 23' "gross neg-
safety," id., or constituted "excessive force or cruel and unusual punishment," Miss. CODE
ANN. § 37-11-57 (1).
226 Florida grants local schools boards the discretion to use physical punishment, FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 232.27(l)(J) (West 1998), but it bars immunity if the officials use "excessive
force or cruel and unusual punishment." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.275 (West 1998).
227 Alabama specifically leaves the question of physical punishment to the school board,
ALA. CODE § 16-28A-1 (1995), but grants immunity both from civil and criminal actions if
school officials followed the policy, ALA. CODE § 16-28A-1 (1995) (stating that "[s]o long as
teachers follow approved policy in the exercise of their responsibility to maintain discipline in
their classroom, such teacher shall be immune from civil and criminal liability"); Arkansas
specifically leaves the question of physical punishment to the school board, ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 6-18-505 (Michie 1999), but grants immunity from civil liability if there was "substantial
compliance with the district's written student discipline policy," ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-17-112
(Michie 1999); Indiana that school officials "stand the relation of parents and guardians to the
students" and that they have the "right ... to take any disciplinary action necessary to promote
... an orderly and effective educational system," IND. CODE ANN. § 20-8.1-5.1-3 (1995), but it
limits immunity to school officials who acted "reasonably under a disciplinary policy adopted
under" a school's corporation disciplinary policy, IND. CODE ANN.§ 34-13-3-3 (19) (Michie
2000); Missouri specifically leaves the question of physical punishment to the school board,
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 160.261(1) (2000), but states that "[t]eachers ... shall not be civilly liable
when acting in conformity with the established policy of discipline developed by each board,"
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 160.261(6) (2000).
228 Ohio prohibits corporal punishment unless the school board adopts a resolution per-
mitting it and forms a task force that will regularly study disciplinary procedures, OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3319.41 (1995), but grants immunity to officials as long as there was no mali-
cious purpose in the act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.03(6) (1995).
229 Arizona allows the school board to decide whether to authorize physical punishment,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-843(B) (2) (West 1999). Arizona preserves common-law immu-
nity, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-820.05 (West 1999), but makes it the exception to the rule.
See Doe ex rel. Doe v. State, 2000 WL 730356 (Ariz. App. Div. 1, June 8, 2000) ("liability of
public servants is the rule in Arizona and immunity is the exception."). Punitive damages are
barred by statute. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-820.04 (West 2000).
230 North Carolina allows school officials to use reasonable force to correct pupils, N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 1 15C-390, 115C-391 (1999), but only authorizes insurance to cover the costs of
judgments against the officials if their actions were without malice, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-
43(b) (1999). Oklahoma does not prohibit a teacher from using "ordinary force as a means of
discipline, including but not limited to spanking, switching or paddling," OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21 § 844 (West 1998), but it only allows school districts to insure school officials, OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 51 § 168(2) (West 2000) (stating that the "board of education of any school
district may . . . [i]nsure any employee of the school district against all or any part of his
liability for injury . . . resulting from an act ... in the scope of employment").
231 Tennessee permits teachers to use "corporal punishment in a reasonable manner,
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-64103 (1996), but bars indemnification by the "local education
agency" if the act was "willful, wanton, or malicious," TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-421 l(a)(2)
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ligence," or "intentional acts." 232 Another state provides for state-funded
legal representation of the challenged official only where the corporal
punishment is administered in good faith. 233
Therefore, since Ingraham, states have increasingly recognized the
importance of children's interest in personal security both in the class-
room and at home by both limiting the authority of public school teach-
ers to physically punish students and by increasing their scrutiny of the
force parents use to discipline their children. These changes reflect an
evolving society, one that understands protecting children from harm fur-
thers the community interest as well as the child's individual interest.
C. PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEWS OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN THE
SCHOOLS AND AT HOME
Numerous educational psychologists support these changes in state
practices. 234 Many of them have vehemently condemned using physical
force to punish students and several have linked some types of discipline
to later violent behavior in students. 235 In effect, they argue that the use
of physical punishment teaches students to be violent themselves. 236
With the nation's growing concern about violence in public schools, one
might naturally question any movement to limit school officials' options
in controlling the student environment. Yet, physical punishment of stu-
dents is justifiable only if it furthers the goals of public education. Ac-
cording to these modern theorists, public schools actually undermine
their educational goals by using physical punishment to discipline chil-
dren. Still, just as the common law recognized the privilege to use force
to defend oneself from impending physical harm, no psychologist has
advocated that public school officials never touch students in their own
(1999). Louisiana similarly grants discretion and bars indemnification for "intentional wrong-
ful act or gross negligence." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:5108.1 (West 2000).
232 Delaware allows the local school board to authorize physical punishment, DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 14 § 701 (1999), but it affords officials only indemnification except for "intentional
acts or ... gross negligence." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14 § 1095 (1999).
233 Kentucky allows state officials to request legal aid from the Attorney General, but the
Attorney General can refuse to represent the official, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12.211 & §
12.212, and the Kentucky Supreme Court has ruled that the school district and school officials
are state entities and employees, see Reis v. Campbell County Bd. of Educ., 938 S.W.2d 880,
885 (Ky. 1996). In South Carolina, when a teacher requests aid, it becomes the "duty of the
school district ... to appear and defend the action or proceeding in his behalf," S.C. CODE
ANN. § 59-17-110 (Law. Co-op. 1999).
234 See infra notes 263-75 and accompanying text.
235 See, e.g., A. Troy Adams, The Status of School Discipline and Violence, 567 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Scl. 140, 143 (2000) (explaining that "[s]chool violence and disci-
pline are not the same concept, but they are related concepts" and equating physical punish-
ment with violent behavior that has a "lifetime impact").
236 See, e.g., Bitensky, supra note 197, at 425 (citing numerous psychological studies
relating corporal punishment to increased potential for aggressive behavior); Orentlicher,
supra note 190, at 157.
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defense or when necessary to control the classroom environment. 237 The
difficulty is in determining when the use of force is necessary and when
it does more harm than good.
Many modem psychologists suggest that, in most situations, striking
a school child causes more psychological damage than would another
form of discipline.238 This modem view sharply contrasts with the ma-
jority opinion in Ingraham239 which described physical punishment as an
effective disciplinary tool, and reasoned that, if anything, granting stu-
dents a hearing before punishment would cause more psychological harm
because such process would increase the student's anxiety and under-
mine the ability of teachers to effectively control the classroom.240 To-
day, educational psychologists such as Irwin A. Hyman241 and Murray
A. Straus, 242 as well as social historians and physicians,2 43 advocate the
elimination of physical punishment both at school and in the home. As
237 See, e.g., IRWIN A. HYMAN ET AL., SCHOOL DISCIPLINE AND SCHOOL VIOLENCE: THE
TEACHER VARIANCE APPROACH 334-35 (1997) (discussing the difference between force used
for self-protection and force used to punish: "all laws and regulations regarding corporal pun-
ishment in schools protect educators' rights to use force to quell disturbances, and to protect
themselves, others' property, or students from self-injury").
238 The American Academy of Pediatrics, for example, denounces spanking, listing the
following problems, among others with the practice:
[1] Spanking children [less than eighteen] months of age increases the chance of
physical injury, and the child is unlikely to understand the connection between the
behavior and the punishment.
[2] Although spanking may result in a reaction of shock by the child and cessation
of the undesired behavior, repeated spanking may cause agitated, aggressive behav-
ior in the child.
[3] Spanking models aggressive behavior as a solution to conflict and has been asso-
ciated with increased aggression in preschool and school children.
[4] Spanking and threats of spanking lead to altered parent-child relationships, mak-
ing discipline more difficult when physical punishment is no longer an option, such
as with adolescents.
[5] Spanking is no more effective as a long-term strategy than other approaches, and
reliance on spanking as a discipline approach makes other discipline strategies less
effective to use. Time-out and positive reinforcement of other behaviors are more
difficult to implement and take longer to become effective when spanking has previ-
ously been a primary method of discipline.
[6] A pattern of spanking may be sustained or increased. Because spanking may
provide the parent some relief from anger, the likelihood that the parent will spank
the child in the future is increased.
Guidance for Effective Discipline, supra note 216, at 726.
239 See Gerald P. Koocher, Different Lenses: Psycho-Legal Perspectives on Children's
Rights, 16 NOVA L. REV. 711, 730 (1992) (criticizing Ingraham v. Wright as ignoring "the
significant body of psychological literature in both interpersonal relationships and learning
theory which shows that aggression tends to breed aggressive behavior").
240 430 U.S. 651, 680, 681 n.51 (1977).
241 See supra note 237.
242 See MURRAY A. STRAUS, BEATING THE DEVIL OUT OF THEM: CORPORAL PUNISHMENT
IN AMERICAN FAMILIES (1994).
243 See, e.g., GREVEN, supra note 189, at 9 (stating that "[c]hild abuse takes many
forms[;]one of them is physical punishment").
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discussed further below, these psychologists contend that when an au-
thority figure, be it a parent or school official, strikes a child, the likeli-
hood of significant psychological injury increases.
Society's continued acceptance of corporal punishment despite evi-
dence of the harm it causes 244 may be grounded in our sociological past.
Historically, American culture encouraged wives to believe that "they
'deserved it"' and viewed beating slaves as a mere form of "disci-
pline. '245 Today "[w]e no longer permit the hitting of servants, appren-
tices, wives, prisoners, and members of the armed forces" 246 but many
still support the physical disciplining of children perhaps because they
themselves were struck as children.247 Psychologists note that few peo-
ple are aware of the effects of corporal punishment on either themselves
or their children and theorize that this lack of awareness may make them
more likely to hit their own children as well.24 8 In short, hitting children
is violence that begets violence.249
244 PAULA M. SHORT ET AL., RETHINKING STUDENT DISCIPLINE: ALTERNATIVES THAT
WORK 85 (stating that "[c]hild abuse and violent crime may ... trace their origin to corporal
punishment"); STRAUS, supra note 242, at 12 (noting that scholars have ignored the studies
that suggest that 99 percent of the parents [that] "hit their children," produce "aggressive
children").
245 STRAUS, supra note 242, at x.
246 Id. at 10.
247 See, e.g., GREVEN, supra note 189, at 9 (contending that parents today continue hitting
their own children because they were struck by their own parents). Parents may also fear that
because they have hit their kids, they could be labeled child-abusers under psychological theo-
ries banning physical punishment. Id. See also STRAUS, supra note 242, at 61 ("[R]egardless
of the age and sex of the child, the more corporal punishment parents experienced as children
the more likely they are to do the same to their own children.").
248 See, e.g., Patrick V. Gaffney, A Study of Preservice Teachers' Beliefs about Various
Issues and Myths Regarding the Use of Scholastic Corporal Punishment, at 5 (May 20, 1997),
available at http://www.edrs.com/DocLibrary4/1197/ED409315.PDF (noting that "the harmful
effects of [physical punishment] do not become obvious right away, often not for years");
GREVEN, supra note 189, at 126 (explaining that "few adults recall the anger they experienced
as children when being punished and hurt by their parents" because they often repress their
rage and pain). See also Koocher, supra note 239, at 730 ("A common rationale cited by
supporters of official corporal punishment tends to be, 'It taught me a lesson when I was their
age.' Of course, all that is truly taught with such techniques is how to pass on the tradition of
abuse.").
249 HYMAN ET AL., supra note 237, at 336 ("Because hitting at home does not help [chil-
dren,] it is just as useless and counterproductive in school. The old saw that 'violence breeds
violence' is supported by this finding. Teachers who do not paddle are most often those who
were rarely if ever spanked or paddled as children."). See also Murray A. Straus & Carrie L.
Yodanis, Corporal Punishment in Adolescence and Physical Assaults on Spouses in Later
Life: What Accounts for the Link? 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 825, 837-38 (1996) (summarizing
the author's study on the effects of corporal punishment and its link to increased family vio-
lence and depression).
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1. Inflicting Psychological Harm
Psychologists have identified various types of harm that can arise
when one is physically punished by an authority figure. At least one
study links the use of corporal punishment to depression, which may in
turn cause numerous other problems 250 such as a greater propensity to
commit suicide,25 1 aggression, inability to succeed in the workplace 252,
and physical expressions of anger toward others. 253 In addition, children
disciplined through physical punishment "are less likely to be able to
learn to solve problems logically"2 54 and may experience greater difficul-
ties developing "an internalized conscience. '255 Striking children causes
them to be fearful and, often, to repress their anger.256 This may in turn
lead to "the stifling of empathy and compassion for oneself and
others" 257 because, when parents strike children, they are in effect both
manifesting and teaching "indifference to suffering. '258 Controlling this
internal anger can also result in children later manifesting "obsessive"
and "compulsive" characters; they may live rigidly as a way of contain-
ing their deep-seated anger.259 In addition, they may experience a
profound sense of ambivalence - love and hate for parents and them-
selves. 260 Many times, children cannot process this hate and they experi-
ence what psychologists call "dissociation" - the most "basic means of
survival for many children" who need to "render unconscious" unbear-
able "feelings and experiences.' 261 As a result, they feel disconnected
from their inner feelings and the "external world. 262
250 GREVEN, supra note 189, at 132; STRAUS, supra note 242, at 77.
251 STRAUS, supra note 242, at 78.
252 Id. at 144-45 (noting that this inability to function well in the workplace seemed to
apply only to college graduates whose success tended to be undermined by "depression, an
inclination to physical violence, a sense of powerlessness, and a lack of internalized moral
standards").
253 Id. at 107.
254 Patrick V. Gaffney, Arguments in Opposition to the Use of Corporal Punishment: A
Comprehensive Review of the Literature, at 10 (Mar. 17, 1997), available at http://www.edrs.
com/DocLibrary4/0897/ED406054.PDF; see also PAULA M. SHORT ET AL., supra note 244, at
85 (stating that "[p]roblem solving via violence and aggression, learned in childhood, likely
carries over into adulthood").
255 STRAUS, supra note 242, at 96.
256 GREVEN, supra note 189, at 132.
257 Id. at 127.
258 Id.
259 See id. at 135.
260 Id. at 142-47.
261 Id. at 148.
262 Id.
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2. Ineffective Discipline in the Classroom
Using physical punishment to discipline children thus significantly
increases the risk of profound and prolonged psychological injury. But
educational psychologists also reject physical punishment as an effective
form of discipline. 263 Fundamentally, this type of punishment distracts
school officials from the task of understanding what motivated the dis-
ruptive behavior in the first place. 264 It also "may produce an anxious,
fearful, angry, and aggressive climate" in the classroom. 265 As result,
even students who merely witness the hitting may experience both
"alienation and anxiety. '266 The presence of corporal punishment in the
public schools is also linked to increased absenteeism and dropout
rates.26
7
The act of striking students for punishment also has other unin-
tended results. Even though a quick slap may stop disruptive behavior, it
ultimately escalates the need for more hitting, with officials needing to
employ "sterner and sterner measures" to control the classroom. 268 Once
officials administer this type of discipline, they face the difficult task of
establishing "open, trusted-based communication" with those students
who have received the corporal punishment. 269 Furthermore, rather than
curbing inappropriate behavior, corporal punishment tends to teach stu-
dents to solve their problems through deviousness and aggression.270
Some psychologists have noted that teachers who administer physical
punishment may also inadvertently undermine their own authority. For
example, some "males tend to equate receiving corporal punishment with
claims to manhood, group solidarity, personal belonging, and a rise in
social status and standing among one's peers," thus leading these stu-
dents to actually enjoy corporal punishment rather than regarding it as a
form of discipline.271
263 See Gaffney, supra note 254, at 5 (examining numerous psychological studies and
concluding that "with few exceptions - this particular procedure is neither suggested nor
defended by any recognized authority on classroom management and discipline"); but cf
Katherine Hunt Federle, Violence is the Word, 37 Hous. L. REv. 97, 106-07 (2000) (support-
ing Gaffney's basic conclusions but noting the limitations of psychological studies that analyze
the effects of corporal punishment).
264 See, e.g., Gaffney, supra note 254, at 9-10 (stating that "corporal punishment does not
achieve its stated goal of the establishment and the preservation of discipline because it is
treating the symptoms, as opposed to the cause, of children's misbehavior").
265 See, e.g., SHORT, ET AL., supra note 244, at 85.
266 Id. at 84.
267 Id. at 85.
268 Id. at 85.
269 Id. at 84.
270 HYMAN ET AL., supra note 237, at 336 (stating that "[w]itnessing and experiencing
corporal punishment, a form of aggression, results in modeling of aggression"); SHORT ET AL.,
supra note 244, at 84.
271 Gaffney, supra note 254, at 6.
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Educational psychologists advocate numerous alternatives to corpo-
ral punishment that are more effective disciplinary tools including behav-
ioral modification, assertive discipline, and logical consequences. 272
Such methods take the student's age into account, thereby echoing the
T.L.O. Court's acknowledgement that the reasonableness of a punish-
ment varies according to whether it is appropriate for a student's age
group. For example, with respect to younger students, "rewards ap-
proaches often are the most effective. '273 For older students, rewards
systems are less effective, but entering into "behavior contracts" with
students, sending "behavioral report cards to parents," 274 or administer-
ing in-school suspensions 275 may be more effective alternatives. These
modern disciplinary approaches lend support to the states' strong trend
toward banning or limiting the use of physical punishment in the class-
room. Courts should consider these important perspectives when assess-
ing the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of corporal punishment.
272 See, e.g., SANDY GARRETT, A HANDBOOK OF ALTERNATIVES TO CORPORAL PUNISH-
MENT 23-32 (4th ed. 1993); FREDERIC H. JONES, POSITIVE CLASSROOM DISCIPLINE 79-140
(1987) (describing how school officials establish important classroom limits); CHARLES H.
WOLFGANG, SOLVING DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS 13-264 (1995) (describing nine models for disci-
plining students). Jones examined the Rogerian (emotionally supportive) model, id. at 13-39;
the transactional model, id. at 45-61; the "social discipline model of Rudolf Dreikurs," id. at
65-90; Glasser's reality therapy, id. at 97-115; the "judicious discipline model," id. at
119-48; the "behavior analysis model," id. at 149-92; the "positive discipline model," id. at
195-245; the "assertive discipline model," id. at 249-65; and the "Dobson Love and Punish-
ment Model," id. at 271-81.
Of these nine different models discussed by Wolfgang, only the last one - the "Dobson
Love and Punishment Model" - advocated the use of physical punishments. In describing
this latter model, Jones made two important points. First, Dobson advocates hitting children in
order to further his religious belief that children will go "to Hell" if they do not adhere to
boundaries. Id. at 273. Wolfgang stated that "Dobson, a former educator who is now a psy-
chologist, does not separate his psychological views from his religious ones." Id. at 274.
Second, other psychologists fundamentally disagree with Dobson. Id. at 280. Dobson's relig-
ious view of hitting children is one that historian Philip Greven examined extensively in his
book advocating the elimination of physical punishments for children. GREVEN, supra note
189, at 46-72. Greven discerned a direct link between fundamentalist Christians' religious
perspectives and their views of hitting children: "The long-sustained persistence of melancholy
and depression among twice-born Protestants is clearly no accident, since it has consistently
been paralleled by the tradition of assault, coercion, and violence against children committed
with the rod, the belt, the hand, and other such instruments of parental discipline." Id. at 134.
273 SHORT ET AL., supra note 244, at 86 (discussing "behavior management techniques"
involving the giving or withholding of "rewards" that compel the teacher to first examine the
reason for the misbehavior and then to reinforce the positive behaviors that are "incompatible
with" the identified misconduct).
274 Id. at 86-87.
275 Id. at 87.
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V. REASONABLE AND UNREASONABLE PHYSICAL FORCE
IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
In assessing whether school officials have violated the Fourth
Amendment's standard of reasonableness, courts must apply the Su-
preme Court's contextual balancing test,2 76 which considers the unique
relationship of students to school officials, modem trends toward alterna-
tive methods of punishment, whether the use of the punishment furthered
educational goals, and the fact-specific circumstances of a given case.
Although one cannot exhaustively describe the protean circumstances
that school officials encounter, schools generally administer corporal
punishment to students either as a means of controlling them or punish-
ing them. When school officials use physical force to control unruly
students and restore peace to the school environment, they have broad
discretion to act under what the Supreme Court labels their "custodial"
and "tutelary" powers. However, the use of physical force to punish stu-
dents is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. As discussed
below, these conclusions complement the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence in both the law enforcement and "special
needs" contexts.
A. ANALOGIZING PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS TO POLICE OFFICERS:
USING FORCE TO CONTROL DISRUPTION
In the context of public schools, determining what constitutes force
to "control" versus force to "punish" may seem a difficult distinction to
make. One way to assess the difference is to consider how the Supreme
Court describes the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of police of-
ficers' use of deadly and non-deadly force when subduing suspects. This
line of cases indicates that the use of force is never reasonable when used
to "punish" suspects; the Fourth Amendment privileges law enforce-
ment's use of physical force only when necessary in furtherance of an
investigation or in apprehending suspects. Similarly, one might argue
that school officials may use force to control and apprehend disruptive
students but may not use force for the explicit purpose of punishing stu-
dents for their misbehavior.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Tennessee v. Garner and Graham
v. Connor explored reasonableness as applied to criminal policing func-
tions.277 These decisions set forth a three-factor test for assessing the
reasonableness of police officers using deadly and non-deadly force that
may also offer some guidance in shaping the reasonableness standard as
applied to public school officials. In both Garner and Graham, the Court
276 See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
277 See supra notes 13-42 and accompanying text.
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considered: (1) the nature of the suspect's alleged offense; (2) the risk to
others if not apprehended; and (3) whether the suspect resisted the of-
ficers' use of physical force. The Court did not limit its analysis to these
factors, but simply used them as aids in determining how to weigh the
opposing sides of the balancing scales: the suspect's interest in personal
security and the government's interest in effective law enforcement, with
society having an interest on both sides of the scale.278
In applying these three factors, the Court created a categorical ap-
proach for the use of deadly force and an objective balancing test for the
use of non-deadly force. The Garner decision established that the Fourth
Amendment permits police officers to use deadly force against suspects
only when the alleged crime involves the threatened or actual infliction
of serious bodily injury to another, reasoning that the suspect's funda-
mental interest in his or her life outweighs the state's interest in appre-
hending non-violent offenders. However, when the issue is the
reasonableness of using non-deadly force, courts and juries must con-
sider "the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second
judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolv-
ing" about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situa-
tion. '279 In short, when law enforcement officers use non-deadly force,
Fourth Amendment reasonableness does not necessarily demand that
they use the least intrusive measures possible to apprehend suspects so
long as their actions are objectively reasonable under the circumstances
of the moment. Officers may act reasonably with bad intentions, and
may act unreasonably with good intentions; the reasonableness inquiry
focuses only on the means used to further the law enforcement goal of
investigating and apprehending suspects, not the officers' individual
states of mind.280
278 See, e.g., SATNAM CHOONGH, POLICING AS SOCIAL DISCIPLINE 25-42 (1997).
Choongh described the two classic views of policing, the "crime control model" and the "due
process model," which characterize differently society's interest in this balancing process:
The crime control model operates on the assumption that the primary purpose of a
criminal process is to repress crime. The State cannot guarantee the social freedom
of its citizens unless it has at its disposal procedures which efficiently screen sus-
pects, determine guilt and secure appropriate punishment for those convicted of
crime .... Whereas the crime control model places immense faith in the ability of
the police to use their administrative expertise to discover the truth, the organizing
matrix of the due process model is the proposition that informal police procedures
are susceptible to misuse and prone to produce error.
Id. at 26, 27. Applying these models to the Fourth Amendment's balancing process, an advo-
cate of the crime control model would view society's interests as protected by giving more
weight to police officers' ability to apprehend suspects, but an advocate of the due process
model would view society's interest as represented in the individual apprehended, more ques-
tioning of the procedures police officers used.
279 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
280 Id. In discussing the analogous question of what constitutes a "seizure" under the
Fourth Amendment, the Court similarly rejected using the minds of individual officials to
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Courts may analogize the principles of Garner and Graham to the
use of physical force by school officials. Both officers and school offi-
cials seek to control an environment as a means of furthering their ulti-
mate objective, whether it be efficient law enforcement or effective
student education. Recently, a police chief and an educator drew this
analogy in proposing a continuum of physical force for educators, 28' one
similar to the continuum that police officers apply when using non-
deadly force. 28 2 Police Chief David Frisby and Professor Joseph Beck-
ham created three categories for school disciplinary infractions: "verbal
disruption," "property damage," and "menacing disruption. ' 283 Frisby
and Beckham described these categories as running along a vertical line,
beginning with verbal disruption and ascending to menacing disrup-
determine whether a seizure had or had not occurred. Brower v. Inyo County, 489 U.S. 593,
598 (1989). The Brower Court stated that it would not "distinguish between a roadblock that
is designed to give the oncoming driver the option of a voluntary stop ... and a roadblock that
is designed precisely to produce a collision." Id. What mattered was that police officers inten-
tionally stopped the suspect, even if they subjectively intended a stop that did not cause the
suspect's death. The Brower Court added another example of how an officer's intent does not
resolve the Fourth Amendment seizure question:
In determining whether the means used that terminates the freedom of movement is
the very means that the government intended we cannot draw too fine a line, or we
will be driven to saying that one is not seized who has been stopped by the acciden-
tal discharge of a gun with which he was meant only to be bludgeoned, or by a bullet
in the heart that was meant only for the leg.
Id. at 598-99.
281 David Frisby & Joseph C. Beckham, Developing School Policies on the Application of
Reasonable Force, 122 EDuc. L. REP. 27, 30-32 (1998).
282 See, e.g., Paul W. Brown, The Continuum of Force in Community Policing, 58 FED.
PROBATION 31, 31 (1994). Probation Officer Brown described a continuum of force:
A use of force continuum is a model by which an officer can choose verbal and
physical reactions to a subject's behavior from a range of options and adequately
stop the subject's hostile behavior and establish command and control over the sub-
ject, but not more . . . . Most continuum of force models are similar and use the
concept of a pyramid or a ladder. At the bottom are the least forceful and most
reversible techniques and at the top, the most forceful and the least reversible. If
there is a starting point or beginning in the continuum of force, it is usually the
officer's mere presence. At the top is lethal force, usually illustrated by the use of a
firearm.
Id. Brown described the following as incremental steps for gaining control of suspects: (1)
"officer presence"; (2) "body language and verbal commands"; (3) "control techniques and
physical defense tactics"; (4) "personal defense sprays," such as pepper spray, Mace, or tear
gas; (5) "striking and jabbing instruments," such as "batons, expandable batons, and black-
jacks"; and (6) "deadly force," which includes firearms and other possible weapons "such as a
baseball bat, a knife, or a vase." Id. at 32. See also Robert G. Hanna, Excessive Use of Force,
in How TO HANDLE UNREASONABLE FORCE LITIGATION: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE STRATE-
GIES IN POLICE MISCONDUCT CASES 355, 357 (1998) (stating that "[m]ost police training in-
cludes some version of use of force continuum"); Kevin Parsons, Decision to Use Force: The
Confrontation Continuum, in 8 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY FEES ANNUAL
HANDBOOK 115, 117-20 (1992) (listing six levels of "force" used by police officers: "dia-
logue," "escort," "pain compliance," "mechanical control," "baton," and "firearms").
283 David Frisby & Joseph C. Beckham, supra note 281, at 32.
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tion.284 A horizontal line intersects at a right angle, indicating what con-
stitutes appropriate disciplinary responses by educators.2 85 Nearest the
intersecting lines is "verbal control," an appropriate response to offenses
such as "talking" and "cursing in class"; in the middle of the bottom line
is "touch control," which addresses "property damage" offenses such as
"breaking windows" or "smashing computers. ' 286 Finally, at the "de-
fense level" of control, educators might physically grab or strike students
who are either "displaying" or "attacking with a deadly weapon. 287
Such striking of students would only be permitted as a defensive act used
to control a violent student and would not be acceptable as a method of
punishment. 28 8
An alternative to the "continuum of force" model is the "wheel"
model. The Federal Bureau of Investigation2 9 and "wheel" model pro-
ponents believe that one problem with a force continuum approach is that
officers may mistakenly believe that they have "to escalate through the
continuum to reach the proper level of force." 290 Under a "wheel" model
theory, officers still have the same options available under a continuum
approach - "command presence, voice commands, controlling force, in-
juring force, and deadly force" 29 1 - but the focus is on what may be
variable degrees of "reasonable force" during a police officer's encounter
with a suspect. 292 In other words, the "wheel swings both ways," al-
lowing an officer to escalate or deescalate the level of force used in re-
sponse to "the officer[s'] reasonable perception of the suspect's apparent
threat at any given moment." 293
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 Id. at 31.
287 Id.
288 Id. at 28. Such an approach is thus consistent with a Fourth Amendment theory of
reasonableness that permits the use of physical force in the public schools only as a tool to
control an unruly student.
289 Interview with John Hall, Legal Instructor for FBI, in Quantico, Va. (Aug. 11, 2000).
Agent Hall stated that the FBI is not opposed to institutions training police officers using a
continuum of force model, but that officers may inadvertently misinterpret what the continuum
means by thinking that they must exhaust all other means before using deadly force. Deadly
force is permissible when the circumstances fall within the parameter set by the Supreme
Court in Tennessee v. Garner. Hall added that, to be effective, such a continuum would need
to have a very identifiable point beyond which the use of deadly force would be permissible.
Hall's viewpoint is consistent not only with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, but also with
how other federal courts and juries have applied Garner to a variety of facts.
290 Brown, supra note 282, at 32.
291 Id.
292 Id. (citing John Williams, Use-of-Force Wheel, POLICE MARKSMAN 48-49 (July/Aug.
1994)).
293 Id. Brown offered the following illustration of the "wheel" model:
For example, the officer receives information on a suspect who has been involved in
a disturbance. The officer confronts the suspect. At this point, no weapons have
been observed by the officer. The wheel of force will spin to a stop at Command
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The continuum of force model and the alternative "wheel" approach
are each consistent with the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment objec-
tive reasonableness standard and with modern educational psychologists'
views of disciplining students and maintaining control in the classroom.
Under either approach, the appropriate level of force varies with the con-
text. School officials respond based on the particular school infraction
committed. In both models, the mere presence of an official and/or the
issuance of verbal commands are in themselves types of "force" that
might control a situation. Educational psychologists suggest that this
type of non-physical force is the best way to control the learning environ-
ment in the public schools while minimizing psychological damage to
the disciplined student.294 Furthermore, both models permit the use of
force only to control students, never to punish them. This is consistent
with the Graham Court's concern that the use of force be objectively
reasonable. The limitations on the use of force proposed by the contin-
uum and wheel concepts also accord with the modern trend among the
states toward banning corporal punishment in the classroom, 295 and with
the Supreme Court's express emphasis in Ingraham v. Wright on can-
vassing state practices.2 96
The Fourth Amendment applies when school officials and police
officers use physical force to "seize" students or suspects. In the class-
room, school officials may block or grab students who attempt to damage
property or hurt another person. Under either model, this type of force is
proportionate to the offender's actions. Courts should view these types
of controlling actions the way they do police officers' actions in control-
ling suspects: "The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer [or public school of-
ficial] on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight."297
Presence and Voice Commands and the officer identifies himself and tells the sus-
pect to stop.
As the suspect realizes the officer is speaking to him, simultaneously recogniz-
ing the officer as a threat to his freedom, he reaches in his waistband and attempts to
draw a partially concealed handgun. The butt of the weapon is now visible to the
officer. The wheel of force now spins to Deadly Force. The officer's weapon is
drawn and leveled at the suspect. Meanwhile, the suspect reaches toward the hand-
gun, but instead of drawing it, succeeds in pushing it through his waistband where it
promptly falls through to his ankle, and onto the ground. The officer observes the
suspect give up his attempt to draw a weapon, just before the officer's trigger is
pulled. The wheel spins to Controlling Force, and the suspect is given Voice Com-
mands at gunpoint, and is safely taken into custody.
Id. This example captured the protean circumstances officers frequently face and the need to
act reasonably in light of the known, shifting circumstances.
294 See supra notes 250-275 and accompanying text.
295 See supra notes 210-233 and accompanying text.
296 See supra notes 160-163 and accompanying text.
297 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
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B. APPLYING THE "SPECIAL NEEDS" DOCTRINE: AFFORDING BROAD
DEFERENCE TO CONTROL DISRUPTIVE STUDENTS AND
ELIMINATING PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT
In addition to the Court's balancing jurisprudence, one must con-
sider the "special needs" doctrine in determining what constitutes reason-
able force in the public schools. In synthesizing the schools' police-like
responsibilities (i.e., to protect student safety) with their duty to educate,
one may interpret the "special needs" doctrine under the Fourth Amend-
ment as permitting school officials to use physical force only when nec-
essary to control the educational environment. This limitation both
furthers the schools' duty to educate and the students' Fourth Amend-
ment personal security interests.
In New Jersey v. T.L.O. and Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,
the Supreme Court applied the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
standard to public schools, as it examined, respectively, searches of an
individual student and a group of athletes. In both situations, it distin-
guished between public school officials and police officers who search or
seize individuals: public school officials are foremost educators, while
police officers are criminal investigators. The Court measured reasona-
bleness in light of these contrasting goals, noting that educators are free
to dispense with warrants, need not have probable cause to believe that a
criminal violation occurred and, sometimes, do not even need reasonable
suspicion to believe that a student violated school rules. Vernonia's
four-part inquiry for assessing the reasonableness of suspicionless drug-
testing suggests a framework applicable, with minor revision, to the issue
of physical force in the public schools. In determining whether the use
of physical force violated a student's Fourth Amendment rights, courts
should examine: (1) "the [personal security] interest upon which the
[seizure] intrudes"; 298 (2) "the character of the intrusion that is com-
plained of';2 9 9 (3) "the nature and immediacy of the governmental con-
cern at issue"; and (4) "the efficacy of this means for meeting it.' '300
Although the Court articulated these (now modified) distinct factors
in Vernonia, a case involving searches without reasonable suspicion,
these factors were nonetheless implicit in New Jersey v. T.L.O., a suspi-
cion-based search, and in the Court's policing jurisprudence in Tennessee
v. Garner and Graham v. Connor. T.L.O. raised specific questions re-
garding school-related seizures that easily fit under these modified fac-
tors: the seizure must be "reasonably related to the objective of the
[seizure] and not excessively intrusive in light of the age .. .of the
298 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995).
299 Id. at 658.
300 Id. at 660.
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student and the nature of the infraction." 30 Similarly both Garner and
Graham stated that reasonableness includes consideration of the offense
committed, whether the individual poses an "immediate threat to the
safety of the officers or others," 30 2 and whether the person resisted ap-
prehension. Vernonia referenced the "character of the intrusion," while
in TL.O., the Court asked whether the challenged search was "exces-
sively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of
the infraction." Although TL.O. added the adverb "excessively" to ques-
tion the degree of intrusion, the sub-issues raised - age, sex, and offense
committed - are a part of the Vernonia Court's third and fourth factors,
the "nature and immediacy of the governmental concern and the efficacy
of this means for meeting it." Therefore, both reasonableness tests com-
pare the degree of the intrusion with the need for it, as did the policing
cases of Garner and Graham.
Thus, though Vernonia, T.L.O., and Garner/Graham do differ doc-
trinally in minor ways, the reasoning of this line of cases also reflects
overriding similarities, the dominant one being that each case defines
reasonableness based upon balancing the individual's interest against the
need to conduct the search or seizure. A synthesis of the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence in this area therefore supports applying a modified
four-factor, Vernonia-type test when defining the contours of Fourth
Amendment reasonableness of physical force in the classroom. Apply-
ing this test indicates that school officials have broad discretion in using
physical force to control students, but that they violate the Fourth
Amendment when they use physical force to "punish" them.
1. Students' Interest in Personal Security
When students enter the public schools to fulfill their state's man-
date that they receive an education, they retain their interest in personal
security safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment. The scope of this inter-
est, as the Court explained in examining students' privacy interests, re-
lates to the particular place they are - the public schools.303 In
assessing privacy interests, the Vernonia Court emphasized two contex-
tual factors: the students had "diminished" rights in comparison to
301 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985). The Court also mentioned that the
"sex of the student" was a factor in determining the reasonableness of a search. A search
implicates strong privacy interests, as can a seizure, but in the context of school discipline, the
sex of a student is not a factor in analyzing the reasonableness of public school officials using
physical force to effectuate a "seizure."
302 Graham, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
303 See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 120 S. Ct. 1375, 1380 (2000) (stating in dicta that safety
concerns in the public schools diminish students' reasonable expectations of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment).
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adults, and students are in the "temporary custody of the State as school
master."30
4
The first factor described the classic view of children having dimin-
ished rights in light of their age, and the second factor detailed the
schools' custodial power and the duty to educate. Although the Court
described these factors as "central" 30 5 to its Fourth Amendment analysis
of suspicionless drug-testing, when the issue involves the application of
physical force to students, students may assert a significant interest in
personal security, one even greater than their interest in the privacy of
their belongings, which too merit Fourth Amendment protection. In
describing this right to bodily integrity, the Court in Terry v. Ohio 3°6
described well that even the act of frisking a person - a search under the
Fourth Amendment - seriously infringes an individual's interest in bod-
ily integrity:
[I]t is simply fantastic to urge that [a frisk] performed in
public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless,
perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a "petty
indignity." It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of a
person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse
strong resentment, and it is not to be taken undertaken
lightly.307
Although the Court drew this conclusion as it examined police of-
ficers' dealing with adults on the streets, public school officials' acts of
grabbing or hitting students are likely to evoke similar responses. The
two contexts are even doctrinally linked because the Court in T.L.O. ap-
plied Terry's two-part inquiry to determine the reasonableness of search-
ing a particular student's purse.
In the context of public schools, viewing students' interest in per-
sonal security is a complex issue because of compulsory education laws.
When school teachers became "public" educators, a shift occurred. No
longer were schools a place where teachers acted solely in loco parentis.
School officials assumed a special duty to educate, one that at times was
in conflict with parents' interests. School officials had "custody" of chil-
dren only to further their public duty to educate.
When students thus entered public schools, the automatic linking of
parents and teachers no longer applied. Even though parents historically
have been able to use physical force to discipline children under both
family privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and under relig-
304 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654.
305 Id.
306 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
307 Id. at 16-17.
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ious views protected by the First Amendment, public schools have
neither of these interests to assert to justify physically punishing chil-
dren. They became a place for public education.
In addition, modern society has increasingly viewed children with
more and more distance from their parents. The establishment of social
service agencies has checked parents' interest in family privacy and in
the exercise of religious beliefs. Simply, children are no longer the prop-
erty of parents; they are under the care of states, who educate them in the
public schools and who monitor their safety at home as well.
In short, public school students have a significant interest in per-
sonal security under the Fourth Amendment. 30 8 They are not like prison-
ers, with significantly diminished rights arising from convictions. 30 9
They are temporarily in the custody of school officials to learn. Even
though students have this significant interest in personal security, a deter-
mination of reasonableness also includes consideration of the three other
Vernonia factors - the degree of intrusion, and the school's need to use
physical force and the means used.
2. Characterizing the Intrusion
In characterizing the nature of the intrusion caused by the use of
physical force, one must examine school officials' objective purpose in
using force. Physical force used to control disruptive students (rather
than to punish them) presents a lesser degree of intrusion upon a stu-
dent's personal security because the goal of the latter is to cause the
student physical and psychological pain, 310 while the former is used
merely to diffuse a disruptive and potentially violent situation. Our soci-
ety has long recognized and accepted the use of physical force as a
means of quelling and controlling the violence of others. Whether we
think of police officers or citizens breaking up fights or schoolteachers
controlling battling students, the use of physical force is often necessary
to restore order and protect others from harm the disruptive individual
might otherwise cause. In the context of the public schools, the use of
force to control is a key function of public school officials' custodial
powers as schools cannot accomplish their educational mission without
308 Even the antiquated decision of Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 676 (1977), stated
that a "child has a strong interest in procedural safeguards that minimize the risk of wrongful
punishment." Id. For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 147-184 and accompanying
text.
309 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338 (1985) (stating that "[w]e are not
yet ready to hold that schools and the prisons need be equated for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment").
310 See Gaffney, supra note 254, at 2-3 (acknowledging the lack of consensus in defining
"corporal punishment" but concluding that the different conceptualizations usually convey the
idea of the purposeful and intentional administration of some degree of pain or discomfort).
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effective physical control of their student population. In contrast to the
use of physical force to punish, reformers have not sought to limit the use
of physical force to regain control of disruption. Order, whether on the
streets or in the public schools, has a place in our society, rooted both in
common and modem law. Physical force used to regain and maintain
order must therefore be characterized much differently than force used to
punish and humiliate a student.
The majority opinion of Ingraham v. Wright3l' failed to compre-
hend the difference between physical force used as a method of control
and force used to punish. In holding that no process was constitutionally
required prior to striking students, the Ingraham Court assumed that hit-
ting a disruptive student was a form of both establishing control in the
classroom and punishing the wrong-doer. However, the facts of the case
clearly reveal that the beatings administered to the plaintiffs were in-
tended solely as punishment. The teachers involved had numerous op-
tions available to control the disruptive students other than striking
them. 312 And even if the teachers subjectively intended merely to con-
trol the students by striking them, the clear effect was one of punishment
because the hitting occurred after the students ceased their disruption.
The harm caused by the intrusion is another factor that must be con-
sidered when assessing the nature of the intrusion. Educational psychol-
ogists argue that children who are physically punished by authority
figures may experience significant psychological harm as a result includ-
ing depression, dissociation, obsessive-compulsive tendencies, and re-
pressed anger and anxiety. 3t 3 In contrast, physical force to control
disruptive students does not engender the magnitude of these psychologi-
cal harms.
3. The State's Interest: Physical Force to Control as a Means of
Advancing Education
To determine the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of striking a
school student, one must also consider the government's interest in em-
ploying force. Included in this third inquiry, in light of the Vernonia,
311 See supra notes 147-184 and accompanying text.
312 Even when physical force does have the effect of immediately stopping disruptive
behavior, it may still be constitutionally unreasonable. For example, in Young v. St. Landry
Parish School Board, 759 So.2d 800, 802 (La. 1999), a schoolteacher allegedly "pulled" a
student away from another student that he was bothering. The majority opinion stated that the
teacher "did not intend to harm" the student, who ended up falling, later incurring almost
$15,000 in medical expenses. Id. at 803. The majority held that the force was reasonable
under state law, which allows teachers to use "reasonable force to maintain order in the class-
room or on school grounds." Id. at 804. The dissent, however, stated that the teacher used
unreasonable force because better "alternative methods of discipline" existed. Id. at 805 (Thi-
bodeaux, J., dissenting).
313 See supra notes 250-262 and accompanying text.
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T.L.O., and Garner/Graham decisions, are the sub-issues of whether
there was an "immediate" need for the force and the nature of the infrac-
tion committed. Under the "special needs" doctrine delineated in
Vernonia, schools must have a "compelling interest" in order to use
force, defined as one that "appears important enough to justify the partic-
ular search. ' 314 The school's interest, therefore, needs simply to "out-
weigh" the student's interest. Without question, the state has an
important interest in allowing its public school officials to use physical
force in order to subdue disruptive students who interfere with the suc-
cessful functioning of the school. The state does not, however, have an
important interest in physically punishing students because such acts
"teach" students to be violent in solving problems. The authority that the
state has relates to its state-law duty to educate. Therefore, the state's
interest in striking students as punishment can never be a "compelling"
one under the Vernonia test.
The Vernonia decision similarly characterized the state's interest in
light of the school's goal to educate students. The Court determined that
the Vernonia school district had an "important enough" interest in requir-
ing drug-testing for school athletes because of the negative physical and
psychological effects of drugs. The majority's reasoning thus linked the
school's interest to its primary goal - education - and credited drug
use with disrupting the "educational process. '315 It also found an "im-
mediate" need for the testing because "[d]isciplinary actions had reached
'epidemic proportions.' "316 Thus, the Vernonia Court determined that
the searches were constitutional, at least in part, because they were nec-
essary to control the school environment. In addition, Vernonia stressed
that the results of the drug tests would not be turned over to the police,
i.e., that the students would not be "punished" for their use of drugs. 3 17
In short, the Vernonia Court approved of drug-testing designed to control
the school environment but not to punish the students.
4. The Efficacy of Physical Force in the Schools
Determining the reasonableness of physical force also requires scru-
tiny of the means that officials used, specifically, the relationship be-
tween the force used and the infraction that precipitated it, and the
efficacy of the force in a particular situation. Though school officials
need not employ the "least intrusive" means of accomplishing their
314 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995).
315 Id. at 662.
316 Id. at 663 (quoting the district court's conclusions). But cf id. at 684 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that that the record failed to establish a drug problem at the school).
317 Id. at 658.
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goals, 318 an assessment of Fourth Amendment reasonableness does re-
quire examination of the effects of the intrusion upon the student in light
of the nature of the infraction committed and the urgency of the situation.
Using physical force on a student, whether for the purpose of con-
trol or punishment, affects that student's physical and psychological
well-being. When school officials administer force solely for the pur-
pose of controlling the student, the force is often proportionate to the
level of resisting force being applied by the student and/or necessary to
diffuse an emergent, violent situation. Just as police officers sometimes
use unreasonable force in controlling suspects, public school officials
may at times act unreasonably by using too much force in controlling
students. Determining when school officials cross this line requires a
case-by-case, objective analysis of the seriousness of the student's infrac-
tion, the intensity of the force used, the emergent circumstances of the
situation, etc.
By comparing the infraction with the need for force, one can discern
the difference between physical force to control and physical force to
punish. Distinguishing between these types of force do not, however,
require determination of a school official's subjective intent. Just as the
Court stated in Garner and Graham, reasonableness is an objective in-
quiry, measuring the reasonableness in light of the facts under considera-
tion. When public school officials use physical force to punish, they
seek to change behavior by inflicting physical and psychological pain;
when they use physical force to control it is because other alternatives
will not stop the disruptive behavior. In short, physical force to punish is
not a last resort technique to controlling a situation. School officials
have a wide variety of other techniques to employ to stop this particular
type of disruptive behavior.
Thus, even though public school officials need not use the "least"
intrusive means to accomplish their goal of educating students, eliminat-
ing physical punishment does not impose on them undue restrictions.
They still have a significant number of alternative means to discipline
disruptive students. For example, courts will not decide that school offi-
cials constitutionally erred in using a social discipline model as opposed
to a positive discipline model. 319 When public school officials use phys-
ical force to punish, they seek to change behavior by inflicting physical
and psychological pain. When they use physical force to control it is
because there are no other alternatives that will bring the disruptive be-
havior to an end.
318 Id.
319 For a discussion of the numerous disciplinary tools that public school officials may
use, see supra notes 272-275 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, while force used to control may sometimes be the only
effective means to restore order, force used to punish is never effective
because of the significant infringement of personal security and because
it undermines the school's goal to educate. Although children may expe-
rience such discipline in their homes, there is a constitutional difference
between parents inflicting this type of harm and public officials commit-
ting this act. The means must further the goal - even under T.L.O.'s
"reasonably related" test. Because students have such a significant inter-
est in personal security and because public school officials are foremost
educators, they must not harm students when other means are easily
available to further their important interest in education. Thus, physical
punishment of school students does not survive scrutiny in light of the
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment personal security jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
When children enter the public schools, they leave their parents be-
hind and experience a unique context, one controlled by state officials.
At school, these officials have temporary custody of students to further
their primary goal - education. To fulfill this goal, officials have used
two different types of physical force: force to control disruptive, fighting
students, and force used as punishment for violating school rules. Both
types of physical force may implicate the Fourth Amendment because
students have a right to be free from "unreasonable" seizures. Determin-
ing whether these seizures are constitutionally "reasonable" depends on
how one balances the interests of the students and school officials. In
light of the United States Supreme Court's modern Fourth Amendment
personal security jurisprudence, school officials may act reasonably
when using force to control disruptive students, but act unreasonably
when they strike students to punish them.
The difference between these two types of force appears when ex-
amining "reasonableness" in two related contexts: police officers' use of
physical force during investigations and arrests, and public school offi-
cials' searches of students. In analyzing the physical force police of-
ficers used, the Court stated that reasonableness is an "objective
standard," one that includes consideration of all the circumstances. One
of those circumstances was technological advancement in weapons,
which compelled the Court to reject the common-law practice of shoot-
ing all fleeing felons. In addition, the Court looked to modem policing
practices to assess what was "reasonable." When the Court thus bal-
anced interests to determine reasonableness, it used modem policing
views as an important factor.
This balancing process also occurred in the Court's cases examining
whether public school officials had conducted "reasonable" searches of
2001] REASONABLENESS UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 453
students. It articulated a four-part balancing standard: the student's inter-
est, the degree of intrusion on that interest, and the school's goals and
means used to further those goals.
When one similarly balances interests in the context of public
school officials' use of physical force, how the balancing scales tip de-
pends on the objectives of the school officials. For example, when
school officials use force to break-up students who are fighting, school
officials resemble police officers (but with the goal of restoring an edu-
cational environment, not criminal prosecution). They need to act
quickly, not only for the benefit of those harming each other, but also for
students near them. Like police officers, school officials "must be
judged from the perspective of a reasonable [school official] on the
scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. '320 The balance
tips strongly in favor of school officials' use of force.
In contrast, when public school officials use physical force to pun-
ish students, they act unreasonably. Ingraham v. Wright, decided in
1977, failed to distinguish between these two types of physical force
when it held that teachers do not need to give "pre-hitting" process to
students before they strike them. The Court assumed that a quick hit was
good psychologically for the student and constituted effective discipline.
It also noted that modem (1970s) practice allowed this hitting in the pub-
lic schools. Since Ingraham, what the Court put in the balancing scales
tips the other way. Numerous states have abandoned hitting in the public
schools, and educational psychologists have declared that hitting does
not teach self-discipline, nor does it create a sound educational atmos-
phere. In addition, the striking may cause students serious psychological
damage.
By interpreting the Fourth Amendment to ban public school offi-
cials from hitting students as a form of punishment, courts would further
public schools' primary goal - creating a positive learning environment
for our nation's youth. Under this view of reasonableness, public
schools teach self-discipline and how to resolve conflict peacefully.
320 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).

